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Overview
This thesis investigates empirically the way in which agents in political bodies can influence
their peers, as well as the ways in which voters respond to the behavior of legislators in
their electoral choices. These relationships are fundamental in trying to comprehend the
way in which political decisions are made. Economists should take particular interest in
these topics, given their importance in understanding the incentives faced by legislators.
Questions as to the possibility of peer eﬀects between political agents are of huge
importance in democratic governments. Political debates play a central role in many
legislative bodies, where the assumption is implicitly made that opinions can be influenced
by the other debate participants. This fundamental assumption is tested in Chapter 1,
which is the first to measure the extent of peer influence regarding reported political
opinions in an explicitly political environment. This has previously not been possible,
given that discussions and debates in legislative chambers take place between participants
with particular characteristics and political interests, making it hard to separate the role of
peer eﬀects in determining their preferences. This thesis makes use of experimental data,
which oﬀers a unique opportunity to distinguish these eﬀects and quantify the degree to
which peer eﬀects can influence political preferences.
In particular, Chapter 1 uses data from an experiment conducted in Australia in 2009
to consider whether participants showed evidence of having influenced one-another during
political discussions. Each of the models used exploits the fact that table allocations were
randomized in this experiment and controls for agents’ characteristics, which were also
recorded. The key finding of this chapter is that when asked to assign weights to eleven
criteria for an eﬀective political system, agents who sat on the same table during the
experiment reported preferences that were more similar than those who did not share a
table. The eﬀect is small at 4.8% of a standard deviation but is statistically significant and
of larger magnitude than other pairing characteristics which could have been expected to
influence the diﬀerences between weighting choices, such as whether the two players were
of the same gender. One year after the Citizens’ Parliament, participants were asked to
report their political positioning on the ‘left-right’ scale. It is not found to be the case
that the table allocations influenced these reported positions.
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Having demonstrated that participants in legislative bodies can influence one-another’s
reported political preferences, this thesis goes on to analyze the relationship between leg-
islators and the constituents they represent, by considering the question of whether politi-
cians who are more active in parliament are rewarded with a higher probability of being
reelected. The particular parliamentary behavior analyzed is the asking of parliamentary
questions. The UK House of Commons uses a ballot system to determine which members
are selected to ask a question from those who expressed an interest in doing so. This
chapter is the first in the literature to exploit this randomization to show that the asking
of such questions increases a member’s chances of being reelected by their constituents.
It is shown that while the ordering of parliamentary questions is determined at random,
the practicalities of conducting debates introduce a potentially endogenous element to the
determination of which questions receive oral answers (particularly the speed at which
questions are answered). This chapter uses a matched sampling approach to cope with
such non-random cases, but also includes alternative results, to show that the findings are
not reliant on the use of this technique.
Chapter 2 exploits a natural experiment to show that Members of Parliament who are
selected to ask parliamentary questions are more likely to be reelected in forthcoming
elections. It was necessary in this study, however, to drop certain observations as a result
of the fact that the Speaker in the House of Commons, who chairs debates, has some
influence over the number of questions reached in each debate, which could undermine the
randomization in these cases. Chapter 3 of this thesis goes on to consider this process in
more detail. This chapter shows that in fact questions posed by older and more experienced
members, as well as those from opposition parties, are more likely to receive oral answers
than should be expected under a true randomization.
Chapter 3 oﬀers the first opportunity to consider the Speaker’s role in parliamentary
debates under the conditions of a ‘natural experiment’. Results presented here point to
the role of the Speaker in controlling the speed at which debates progress as contributing
significantly to the findings listed above, for example by acquiescing to pressure from more
senior members by allowing them to ask their questions in debates where time constraints
would otherwise prevent them from doing so. The finding is also an important consider-
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ation for future studies which aim to exploit such randomizations as natural experiments
relating to parliamentary activity.
Such a finding is potentially significant in the context of the UK political system, where
the ballot system is in place precisely to ensure that all members of the House of Commons
have an equal opportunity to ask questions, regardless of their levels of seniority.
The final chapter of this thesis continues to examine the link between legislators and the
citizens they represent. In particular, Chapter 4 makes use of the large Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) dataset from the USA. While this dataset has been
extensively used to study health outcomes, this chapter represents the first attempt to use
the dataset to study the link between political outcomes and the economic prosperity of
constituents. This is achieved by matching survey respondents to their representatives in
Congress and restricting attention to cases where members of the lower house seek election
to the upper house.
Members of the US Senate (the ‘upper house’ in Congress) are elected to serve a state
as a whole, whereas members of the House of Representatives (the ‘lower house’) serve
a district within one of those states. This chapter shows that members of the House
of Representatives who seek election to the Senate (without necessarily being successful)
tend to have previously served in districts with permanently higher incomes. Furthermore,
incomes are found to be temporarily higher in districts where the representatives are
successfully elected to the Senate than those where the representatives were unsuccessful
in their attempt to be elected. This is interpreted as showing that in Senate elections,
voters reward legislators who served districts where average incomes were seen to increase
under their tenure.
These chapters use a diverse range of datasets to consider the impacts of political
behavior. It is shown that the behavior of agents in political environments not only
influences their peers, but is also recognized and rewarded by the voters they represent.
Voters are found to respond to political behavior by both reelecting legislators who are
more active (by asking more parliamentary questions) and by electing those legislators
who have previously served districts where average incomes increased under their tenure.
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Chapter 1
Peer Eﬀects in an Experimental
Parliamentary Setting
1.1 Introduction
Many group decisions rely on debates and discussions. In some cases these debates form a
negotiation process, with those involved required to agree on a particular course of action.
In other cases, including many parliamentary systems, debates are held as a precursor to
a vote, with each participant in the debate casting one vote to either accept or reject the
proposal being discussed.
It is therefore of interest to economists and political scientists whether policymakers
are able to influence one another’s voting choices in such political settings. For economists
this is particularly relevant because it leads to the possibility of strategic behavior among
those taking part in the debate. A vast literature on peer eﬀects in networks spans
many disciplines across the social sciences. Notable examples include the study of college
roommates (Sacerdote (2001)), where the random assignment of students to shared college
accommodation was found to influence academic achievement. Restricting attention to the
transmission of political views within networks, Campos and Fernanda (2012) and Dey
(1997) consider how political ideologies are transferred between college students. This
study represents the first study to test for the transmission of political ideas between
agents in an explicitly political setting.
While an increasing amount of data has become available on the ‘networks’ that exist
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between agents, a common problem in such studies is that researchers are unable to dis-
tinguish those eﬀects that are transmitted between players who are linked by the network
from those that led to its formation in the first place. In particular, in many settings agents
have some influence over the players with whom they are ‘linked’, however such links are
defined. In social settings where a link denotes ‘friendship’, for example, it might be ex-
pected that agents sharing similar characteristics are more likely to choose to link with
one-another. Under such ‘homophily’, if two linked players are found to behave in similar
ways, it is not possible to determine whether that eﬀect comes from players influencing
each other via the network, or from the fact that players with such similar characteris-
tics would always behave in similar ways, regardless of the presence of the friendship link
between them.
The Australian Citizens’ Parliament (ACP) was an experiment conducted in 2009,
where Australian citizens were selected at random to take part in a four-day process, with
the task of answering the question: “How can Australia’s political system be strengthened to
serve us better?” Each participant in the ACP was randomly selected as the representative
for one of the 150 electorates across Australia. Members were asked to collaboratively
generate proposals for improving the Australian democratic system, with each member
then weighting these proposals according to their perceived importance.
Following the four day deliberation process, these prioritized proposals were put forward
to the Australian government, thus oﬀering participants a genuine sense of worth in this
experimental parliamentary process. This dataset makes it possible to analyze whether
these weighting choices were influenced by other factors and particularly other partici-
pants. Finally, the background characteristics recorded for each player can be included in
regressions as controls.
Much analysis has been carried out on the recorded findings from the ACP, some
examples of which can be found in The Australian Citizens’ Parliament and the Future of
Deliberative Democracy . A key part of this analysis has been to determine the eﬀectiveness
of democratic procedures. Within this objective, this chapter will build on the findings
reported in Tucker and Gastil (2013) in the above edition, by looking for evidence of
whether ACP participants were able to influence other players through their debates. The
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purpose of this study will be to oﬀer a more detailed explanation of the testing process
which provided these results, as well as considering some proposed alternative estimation
techniques.
The key component of the ACP organization is that players were allocated at random
to diﬀerent tables at the start of each of the four days. This design feature of the ACP
experiment can be exploited by comparing the behavior of players who shared a table
with that of players who did not share a table. Under these conditions, if two ACP
participants who shared a table during the debating process are on average more likely to
report similar preferences at the end of the debates, this can therefore be attributed to the
table allocation itself. By contrast, without the aid of the randomized table allocations, in
the event that ‘table contacts’ reported more similar preferences than those who did not
share a table, it would be possible to argue, for example, that participants sharing similar
characteristics were simply more likely to choose to sit together, and also then more likely
to report similar preferences. This would explain the correlation between table allocations
and reported preferences, even in the absence of any direct eﬀect between the players
themselves during the debate.
An important motivation for political and other debates is the idea that through ex-
changing opinions, a somehow more desirable outcome will be reached. Such a hypothesis
relies on the assumption that opinions are malleable and can therefore be influenced by
the information or perspective provided by others during the discussions. Without this
possibility, the debate itself simply oﬀers participants the opportunity to air their views,
with no prospect of aﬀecting the decision-making itself. This study considers whether this
basic pre-requisite for eﬀective debate is itself evident in the data described above.
The first part of the chapter supplements the findings of Tucker and Gastil (2013), by
using similar dyadic regression techniques to infer whether the allocation to tables aﬀected
the preferences reported by the subjects in the experiment. This chapter, however, adopts
the method proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) for calculating standard errors in
dyadic regressions. The second part of the chapter goes on to consider alternative estima-
tion techniques. The first such method instead treats individuals as separate observations
and uses instrumental variables to determine whether agents reported similar preferences
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to those with whom they shared a table during the experiment, following the method
of Bramoulle et al. (2009). The final results will revert to dyadic regression techniques,
but with political leaning of participants on the ‘left-right’ scale as reported in surveys
conducted one year after the ACP took place as the dependent variable.
1.2 Criteria to be Weighted
On the third day of the ACP deliberations, players were asked to prioritize various criteria
which they deemed to be important in an eﬀective political system. To achieve this,
players were given a list of eleven criteria and asked to assign weights to each of these
criteria, with a total weighting allocation of 100 and a maximum weight of 30 available to
be allocated to each criterion. The eleven criteria to be weighted were:
1. Freedom (‘Fdm’)
2. Inclusiveness (‘Incl’) - especially multiculturalism and minority groups
3. Transparency (‘Trans’) - open and honest political system
4. Access to information (‘AcInf’)
5. Access for all to the political system (‘AcPol’)
6. Guaranteed education for all (‘EdAll’)
7. Respect for the environment (‘RspEn’)
8. Diverse media (‘DivMd’)
9. Justice and fairness in government (‘FrGov’)
10. Active Citizenship (‘AcCit’)
11. Simplified electoral system with accessible government (‘SimEl’)
Each of the ACP participants therefore allocated 100 weighting points across each of these
criteria, to reflect their perceived relative importance. The average weights assigned to
each of the criteria across participants are reported in Figure 1.1. The weighting choices
across these criteria will be used to form the dependent variable in the regressions that
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Figure 1.1: Bar chart showing the mean weights assigned to each of the eleven criteria for
a ‘healthy, democratic, political system’.
follow in Section 1.4. The objective will be to analyze whether players who shared tables
allocated weights which were on average closer together than other players who did not
share a table during the ACP process.
1.3 The ACP Network
ACP participants held discussions within the tables to which they were randomly assigned
on each day of the ACP. The definition of a link used in this chapter says that any two
players i and j are linked as ‘neighbors’ if they were allocated to the same table on any
of the first three days of the ACP. On day 1, players were assigned their tables, which
results in a number of individual fully-connected networks, one for each table. The first-
day network is illustrated in Figure 1.2(a), with each player represented by a node, and
a line drawn between any two players who were allocated to the same table during the
first day of the ACP. The table allocations were re-randomized at the start of the second
day. Linking all players who shared a table on days 1 or 2 results in the network shown in
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Figure 1.2(b). Similarly, table allocations were re-randomized at the start of the third day.
Figure 1.2(c) therefore illustrates the network where any two players who shared a table
on any of the first three days of the ACP are joined by a link. Given that weights were
assigned to the criteria listed in Section 1.2 on the third day of the ACP, this third-day
network is the one used for the analysis that follows.
To give some further idea of the characteristics of the network defined in this way, the
average number of links per player is 15.9, with a standard deviation of 1.4. The minimum
number of table contacts for any player is 11, while the maximum is 18. The fact that
some players saw more repetition among their table contacts than others leads to this
variation in the total number of contacts, as two players assigned to the same table on
more than one occasion are treated in the same way as players who shared a table only
once.
1.4 Dyadic Regressions
This section considers each possible pairing of ACP participants, and asks whether those
pairings who were randomly assigned to the same table over the course of the first three
days of the ACP were more likely to report similar weighting choices in regard to the crite-
ria for an eﬀective political system. The results reported in Tucker and Gastil (2013) were
based on dyadic regressions, very similar to the ones reported here, but where standard
errors were calculated using the ‘quadratic assignment procedure’ (Hubert and Schultz
(1976); Krackardt (1987)). Conversely, standard errors reported here in Tables 1.1 to 1.4
are based on the method proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), where the variance-
covariance matrix is calculated taking into account the fact that the error terms associated
with dyads which share individuals cannot be assumed to be uncorrelated.
1.4.1 The Dyadic Regression Model
The dyadic regression model considers each possible pairing of participants as a separate
observation in the data. For any such pairing ij, the dependent variable (yij) in these
regressions is the total diﬀerence between the weighting choices of players i and j across
all 11 criteria. Letting wci represent the weighting choice of player i for criterion c, this
17
Figure 1.2: Illustrations of the ACP network with links added cumulatively over the first
three days of discussions
(a) The ACP with players matched to the same table on day 1
joined together by a link
(b) The ACP with players matched to the same table on days 1
or 2 joined together by a link
(c) The ACP with players matched to the same table on days 1,
2 or 3 joined together by a link
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dependent variable can be expressed as:
yij =
11X
c=1
  wci   wcj  
This dependent variable is designed to provide a measure of the diﬀerence between the
weighting choices of the two participants that make up each pairing. Lower values indicate
that a pairing is comprised of two participants whose weighting choices are more similar.
The explanatory variable of interest in these regressions will be a dummy variable
indicating whether the two players involved in the pairing were assigned to the same
table on any of the first three days of the ACP discussions. Given that this variable is a
characteristic of the pairing itself, it can be denoted xij. Letting T di represent the table
allocation of player i on day d, you have:
xij =
8>><>>:
1 if T 1i = T 1j , T 2i = T 2j , or T 3i = T 3j
0 otherwise
By regressing the dependent variable described previously on this explanatory variable
indicating whether each pairing of players shared a table, it is possible to compare the
average total weighting diﬀerence among those who shared a table with the corresponding
value among those who did not share a table. A negative coeﬃcient would then imply that
those pairings who shared a table chose weights that were closer together. Furthermore,
under the experimental conditions enjoyed here, such a result could be attributed to the
table allocation itself.
It is possible to control for the characteristics of each pairing using data collected on
ACP participants. For any individual characteristics of players i and j, denoted zi and zj
respectively, it is possible to control for the absolute diﬀerence between these values, as
well as the sum. Some of these control variables will take the form of ordered categorical
variables. These variables are centered around zero to aid the interpretation of binary
variables in the regressions which include interaction terms.
Including categorical variables as continuous controls imposes a linearity assumption
on the correlation between these variables and the dependent variable. While this is
undesirable, the inclusion of many dummy variables is not possible in paired regressions
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of this kind. The approach used here is justified because as a result of the randomized
nature of table allocations, those allocations should not be correlated with any of these
additional control variables. Their inclusion is therefore primarily intended to improve the
precision of the findings, as opposed to addressing omitted variables bias.
This gives the following regression equation explaining the absolute diﬀerence between
the reported political attitudes of all possible player pairings:
yij = ↵ +  xij +  1 |zi   zj|+  2 (zi + zj) +  1xij |zi   zj|+  2xij (zi + zj) + "ij
In a simple version of the model with no interaction terms and one binary control
variable for each player capturing their gender (zi = 1 if player i is female), the average
eﬀect of an increase in the number of females in a pairing from 0 to 1 on the dependent
variable is captured by  1 +  2. Representing the dependent variable for given values of
the controls as yij (xij, zi, zj), you have:
 1 +  2 = yij (x, 0, 1)  yij (x, 0, 0)
Conversely, the diﬀerence between the dependent variable among all-male pairings com-
pared with all female pairings is given by 2 2, so you have:
2 2 = yij (x, 1, 1)  yij (x, 0, 0)
After introducing interaction terms, the value  1+ 2 captures the diﬀerence between the
eﬀect of being matched to the same table between all-male pairings and pairings comprised
of one female and one male participant:
 1 +  2 = (yij (1, 0, 1)  yij (0, 0, 1))  (yij (1, 0, 0)  yij (0, 0, 0))
Similarly, 2 2 captures the diﬀerence between the eﬀect of sharing a table on the de-
pendent variable for pairings who consist of two male participants and those consisting of
two female participants:
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2 2 = (yij (1, 1, 1)  yij (0, 1, 1))  (yij (1, 0, 0)  yij (0, 0, 0))
All the tables that follow will report the coeﬃcients themselves, with the analysis
explaining their interpretation in more detail where necessary. Given that these controls
do not benefit from the same randomization as the explanatory variable of interest  ,
discussion of their interpretation will in general be kept to a minimum, except in providing
some context for the coeﬃcient of interest.
1.4.2 Calculating Standard Errors
Calculating standard errors in the usual way would ignore the dependence that exists
between pairings who share one of their participants. In particular, it is not possible
to assume that "ij is uncorrelated with "ik, because both are dependent on player i.
For this reason, Tucker and Gastil (2013) used the ‘quadratic assignment procedure’ to
calculate p-values directly. This procedure involves re-randomizing the network many
times, so that in each case there can be no correlation between table allocations and the
dependent variable. By recording the model coeﬃcients under each new randomization,
it is possible to estimate the distribution of coeﬃcients directly. The point at which the
unrandomized coeﬃcients then fall within this estimated distribution can then be used to
infer the significance of the coeﬃcients.
Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) provide an alternative method, which is claimed to be
more eﬃcient, and involves calculating standard errors using a variance-covariance matrix
which accounts for the cross-observation correlation described above.
To explain this diﬀerence, introduce the variable:
mijkl =
8>><>>:
1 if i = k, i = l, j = k, or j = l
0 otherwise
So, the variable mijkl indicates whether either player in the dyad ij is also a member
of the dyad kl. Using this definition, and letting N and K represent the number of
dyadic observations and number of regressors respectively, the variance-covariance matrix
for calculating network-corrected standard errors takes the form:
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In particular, when calculating standard errors in the usual way, oﬀ-diagonal elements
in the matrix E [""0 | X] are zero, because individual error terms are unrelated. This is
not the case for paired data. In this case, if any two error terms "ij and "kl share one
of their players (if i = k, i = l, j = k, or j = l), then you will have mijkl = 1. This in
turn means that the corresponding oﬀ-diagonal element in the matrix E [""0 | X] can be
non-zero.
1.4.3 Dyadic Regression Results
The first column of Table 1.1 reports the results of the most basic dyadic regression, where
the total weighting diﬀerence between each pairing (yij) is regressed on the ‘Pairing shared
a table’ dummy variable (xij), without any controls for participant characteristics. The
negative coeﬃcient reported here implies that pairings assigned to the same table during
the ACP on average choose weights that are closer together by 1.4 weighting points. Given
that there are 11 criteria, this implies that pairings who shared a table choose weights
that are on average 0.13 weighting points closer together on the 0-30 scale for any one
criterion.1 This might seem to be a small eﬀect, but based on network-corrected standard
errors described above, this eﬀect is found to be statistically significant at the 5% level.
The second column in Table 1.1 reports the results of a similar regression, but this time
controlling for some basic characteristics of participants, including gender, age and edu-
cation levels. The ‘Age’ and ‘Education’ variables are both categorical variables, and are
included as such in regressions. This in turn means that when interpreting the correspond-
ing coeﬃcients, it should be noted that the ‘Diﬀerence between age-groups of pairing’ and
‘Diﬀerence between education groups of pairing’ in these cases correspond to diﬀerences
between the category numbers. Category numbers range from 1 to 5 in the case of the
‘Age’ variable, which generally put the participants into ten-year age brackets, and 1 to 4
for the ‘Education’ variable. None of these control variables are found to have a significant
1The mean diﬀerence between weighting choices for any single criterion is 8.82 and the
standard deviation is 2.64.
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Table 1.1: ACP participants were asked to assign weights to eleven criteria for an eﬀective
political system. For each possible pairing of participants, it is possible to calculate the
diﬀerence between their weighting choices for each criterion. Summing these diﬀerences
across all the criteria oﬀers a measure of the diﬀerence between the political attitudes
of the pairing. The following table reports the results of dyadic regressions using this
total weighting diﬀerence (yij =
P11
c=1
  wci   wcj  ) as the dependent variable (mean 97.1,
standard deviation 29.1), based on the entire dataset. The aim is to determine whether
pairings who shared a table reported preferences across the criteria that were more similar
than those pairings who did not share a table.
(1) (2) (3)
Pairing shared a table -1.403⇤ -1.435⇤ -1.425⇤
(-1.97) (-1.99) (-1.99)
Diﬀerent-gender pairing 0.414 0.415
(0.78) (0.78)
No. of females in pairing -1.071 -1.092
(-0.50) (-0.51)
Diﬀerence between age-groups of pairing 0.236 0.228
(0.37) (0.36)
Sum of age-groups in pairing 0.307 0.334
(0.42) (0.46)
Diﬀerence between education groups of pairing 0.639 0.642
(0.94) (0.95)
Sum of education groups in pairing -0.560 -0.586
(-0.67) (-0.70)
Diﬀerent internet access pairing 0.0966
(0.21)
No. of people with internet access in pairing 0.930
(0.38)
Observations 21462 21462 21462
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 1.2: Table with simply-defined control variables to aid interpretation of the ‘Table
match’ coeﬃcients. Again, this table reports the results of dyadic regressions using the
total weighting diﬀerence (yij =
P11
c=1
  wci   wcj  ) as the dependent variable (mean 97.1,
standard deviation 29.1), based on the entire dataset, with the aim of determining whether
pairings who shared a table reported preferences across the criteria that were more similar
than those pairings who did not share a table. Defining control variables in this way makes
it possible to directly assess the size of the coeﬃcient associated with the explanatory
variable of interest.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pairing shared a table -1.403⇤ -1.432⇤ -1.438⇤ -1.433⇤
(-1.97) (-2.03) (-2.03) (-2.02)
Same gender pairing -0.436 -0.433 -0.417
(-0.78) (-0.78) (-0.75)
Same age category pairing -0.883 -0.837
(-0.86) (-0.81)
Same education category pairing -0.781
(-0.73)
Observations 21462 21462 21462 21462
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
eﬀect on the dependent variable, however it remains the case that those pairings who were
randomly assigned to the same table during the course of the ACP chose weights that were
closer together than those pairings who did not share a table. The size of this coeﬃcient
is of similar magnitude to the first column, and remains significant at the 5% level.
The final column in Table 1.1 controls for one extra characteristic, namely the internet
access available to the participants who made up the pairings. With no survey questions
relating to participant income, this is intended as a form of (very imperfect) proxy. Again,
none of the control variables are statistically significant, but the coeﬃcient of interest
remains significant at the 5% level, suggesting that those pairings who shared tables chose
weights that were on average closer together.
To assess the magnitudes of these coeﬃcients, comparison with the size of the other
coeﬃcients in Table 1.1 is not straightforward because of the way in which these coeﬃcients
must be interpreted. Table 1.2 reports the results of regressions with some simply-defined
control variables included to allow a straightforward comparison.
The first thing to note is that the magnitude of the coeﬃcient of interest is largely
unchanged from Table 1.1 in these regressions, at around -1.4. This shows that while
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control variables defined in this way control for less of the variation in their respective
variables than in Table 1.1, the eﬀect on the ‘Pairing shared a table’ variable is largely
unchanged.
The second column of this table reports the results of a dyadic regression of the total
weighting diﬀerence on a dummy variable indicating whether the two players in each
pairing shared a table in the ACP, with a single additional control variable which indicates
whether the two participants that make up each pairing were of the same gender (0 if they
were of diﬀerent gender, 1 if they were the same gender). Table 1.2 shows that same-gender
pairings were found to choose weights that were just 0.4 weighting points closer together
than pairings made up of diﬀerent-gender participants. This translates to an eﬀect of 0.04
weighting points per criterion. The eﬀect of having shared a table at the ACP on the
closeness of a pairing’s weighting choices is therefore found to be more than three times
larger than the estimated eﬀect of a pairing being made up of two players of the same
gender.
The third column in Table 1.2 introduces an additional dummy variable, which takes
the value 1 if a pairing consists of two participants from the same age category and 0
otherwise. Results in this case show that players from the same age category choose
weights that are 0.9 weighting points closer together across the 11 criteria, or 0.08 per
criterion. Similarly therefore, the eﬀect of having shared a table during the ACP is found
to be larger than the eﬀect of two players being of similar age.
Finally, the fourth column in Table 1.2 introduces a similar dummy variable which is
equal to 1 if the two players in a pairing came from the same education category and 0
otherwise. Pairings made up of players from the same education category are found to
choose weights that are around 0.8 weighting points closer together across all the criteria,
which in this case translates to such pairings choosing weights that are 0.07 weighting
points closer together on the 0-30 scale for a single criterion. Again, this eﬀect is found to
be smaller than the eﬀect of the two players having shared a table at the ACP in bringing
their weighting choices closer together.
A year after the conclusion of the ACP process, participants were also asked to re-
port their position on the ‘left-right’ political scale. In particular, an ACP questionnaire
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contained the question “In political matters, people talk about the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ in
Australia. Please use the response scale provided to say if you are to the left, the cen-
tre, or to the right?” Participants were then arranged on a five-point scale according to
these responses, with those choosing ‘Strongly left’ assigned a value 1, and those choosing
‘Strongly right’ assigned a value 5.
This variable can be included as an additional control variable. Not all participants
oﬀered responses to this question, however, so the dataset is substantially reduced by
doing so. The results in Table 1.3 are therefore based on pairings between 107 individual
participants, as opposed to 147 previously. To aid comparison, the first three columns
in this table report the results of similar regressions to Table 1.1, but based only on the
sub-sample of participants who disclosed their political leaning on the ‘left-right’ scale.
As was the case with the whole sample, those pairings randomly assigned to the same
table during the ACP were found to assign weights that were closer together than those
pairings who were never assigned to the same table. The coeﬃcients are now larger in
absolute terms, at -3.0 in each of the first three regressions, and also now significant at
the 1% level, despite the smaller sample size. Once again, as there are 11 criteria, this
implies that for any one criterion, pairings who shared a table chose weights that were
0.27 weighting points closer together than pairings who did not share a table. None of the
other controls are found to have a significant impact on the dependent variable.
The fourth column of Table 1.3 then introduces the ‘left-right’ variable as an additional
control, but its inclusion has very little impact on the explanatory variable of interest,
with the coeﬃcient barely changing at -3.0 and remaining significant at the 1% level.
Finally, the fifth column of Table 1.3 reports the results of similar regressions, but with
the inclusion of additional interaction terms between variables related to self-reported
political positioning and the ‘Pairing shared a table’ dummy variable. To aid the inter-
pretation of the coeﬃcient of interest, the ‘Left-right’ variable is rescaled to ensure it has
zero mean. Under these conditions, the explanatory variable of interest remains close to
-3, and significant at the 1% level, so the finding that pairings who sat on the same table
choose more similar weights persists.
The inclusion of the interaction terms implies that for pairings with political positions
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Table 1.3: For each possible pairing of participants, it is possible to calculate the diﬀerence
between their weighting choices for each criterion. Summing these diﬀerences across all the
criteria oﬀers a measure of the diﬀerence between the political attitudes of the pairing. The
following table reports results from dyadic regressions with this total weighting diﬀerence
(yij =
P11
c=1
  wci   wcj  ) as the dependent variable (mean 95.5, standard deviation 28.2).
The aim is again to determine whether pairings who shared a table reported preferences
across the criteria that were more similar than those pairings who did not share a table.
Results in all columns are based only on those observations for which data on self-reported
political leaning is available.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pairing shared a table -3.034⇤⇤ -3.036⇤⇤ -3.017⇤⇤ -2.966⇤⇤ -3.087⇤⇤
(-2.80) (-2.70) (-2.73) (-2.65) (-2.74)
Diﬀerent-gender pairing 1.407 1.406 1.417 1.413
(1.28) (1.27) (1.29) (1.28)
No. of females in pairing -0.0868 -0.00461 -0.00725 -0.00720
(-0.03) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00)
Diﬀerence between age-groups of pairing -0.450 -0.410 -0.415 -0.440
(-0.56) (-0.52) (-0.51) (-0.54)
Sum of age-groups in pairing 0.975 1.074 1.000 0.994
(1.08) (1.21) (1.08) (1.07)
Diﬀerence between education groups of pairing 0.615 0.626 0.591 0.588
(0.94) (0.96) (0.90) (0.90)
Sum of education groups in pairing -0.717 -0.787 -0.917 -0.919
(-0.82) (-0.90) (-1.07) (-1.07)
Diﬀerent internet access pairing -0.0510 -0.0348 -0.0521
(-0.16) (-0.11) (-0.17)
No. of people with internet access in pairing 2.336 2.303 2.273
(0.87) (0.86) (0.85)
Diﬀerence between political positons of pairing 1.071 1.437
(0.94) (1.31)
Combined political position pairing -0.225 -0.117
(-0.16) (-0.08)
Diﬀ. btw. political pos. * Table match dummy -3.255⇤
(-2.07)
Combined political pos. * Table match dummy -0.928
(-1.42)
Observations 11342 11342 11342 11342 11342
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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one category further apart, holding their combined political position constant, the coeﬃ-
cient associated with being matched to the same table is reduced by 3.26 weighting points.
Given that the eﬀect of being assigned to the same table is to reduce the diﬀerence between
the weighting choices of pairings, this implies that the negative eﬀect will be much larger
among those pairings whose political positions are more diﬀerent. This intriguing result
therefore suggests that the weighting choices of players are more likely to be pushed closer
together by being allocated to the same table if those players hold very diﬀerent political
beliefs.
In light of this result, Table 1.4 reports the results of similar regressions, but where
rather than using participants’ own assessment of their political leaning as a control vari-
able, an alternative measure of their political preference is inferred from their answers to a
diﬀerent survey question. In particular, participants were asked to respond to the following
statement: “Our society would be better oﬀ if the distribution of wealth was more equal”.
Those who report that they “Strongly agree” to this statement are placed at one end of
the five-point scale, and are assumed to correspond with those participants who should
consider themselves ‘left-wing’. Conversely, those who “Strongly disagree” are placed at
the other end of the scale, forming a group assumed to contain ‘right-wing’ participants.
The use of this alternative measure also serves to counter the suggestion that participants
may misreport their own political preferences.
Table 1.4 works exactly as Table 1.3, in that all regressions are based on the same
subset of the sample for whom data on political leaning (now inferred from the alternative
question) are available.
The coeﬃcient of interest remains negative, and significantly so, throughout all five
regressions considered. This suggests that among those participants who responded to
the distribution of income question, those pairings who were assigned to the same table
chose weights that were cumulatively 2.8 weighting points closer together than those who
never shared a table. Once again, no other control variables have coeﬃcients significantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. This translates to pairings who shared a table assigning
weights to each criterion that are 0.26 weighting points closer together on the 0-30 scale.
The interaction terms between the political positioning variables and the dummy vari-
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Table 1.4: For each possible pairing of participants, it is possible to calculate the diﬀerence
between their weighting choices for each criterion. Summing these diﬀerences across all the
criteria oﬀers a measure of the diﬀerence between the political attitudes of the pairing. The
following table reports results from dyadic regressions with this total weighting diﬀerence
(yij =
P11
c=1
  wci   wcj  ) as the dependent variable (mean 95.8, standard deviation 28.4).
The aim is again to determine whether pairings who shared a table reported preferences
across the criteria that were more similar than those pairings who did not share a table.
Results in all columns are based only on those observations for which data is available
on ‘inferred’ political leaning, i.e. based on responses to the statement that “Our society
would be better oﬀ if the distribution of wealth was more equal”.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pairing shared a table -2.873⇤⇤ -2.866⇤ -2.832⇤⇤ -2.838⇤⇤ -2.856⇤⇤
(-2.63) (-2.54) (-2.58) (-2.59) (-2.67)
Diﬀerent-gender pairing 1.040 1.040 1.050 1.040
(1.12) (1.11) (1.12) (1.11)
No. of females in pairing -0.524 -0.283 -0.357 -0.356
(-0.21) (-0.12) (-0.15) (-0.15)
Diﬀerence between age-groups of pairing -0.0524 -0.0142 0.00976 0.0134
(-0.06) (-0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Sum of age-groups in pairing 1.218 1.324 1.473 1.474
(1.36) (1.51) (1.71) (1.71)
Diﬀerence between education groups of pairing 0.864 0.843 0.802 0.798
(1.22) (1.20) (1.13) (1.12)
Sum of education groups in pairing -0.593 -0.746 -0.455 -0.454
(-0.67) (-0.83) (-0.50) (-0.49)
Diﬀerent internet access pairing 0.388 0.395 0.397
(0.62) (0.63) (0.62)
No. of people with internet access in pairing 3.797 3.694 3.702
(1.35) (1.31) (1.32)
Diﬀerence between political positons of pairing 0.400 0.347
(0.45) (0.40)
Combined political position pairing 0.766 0.819
(0.76) (0.82)
Diﬀ. btw. political pos. * Table match dummy 0.515
(0.42)
Combined political pos. * Table match dummy -0.481
(-0.85)
Observations 11990 11990 11990 11990 11990
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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able of interest indicating whether players shared a table, which were previously negative,
are now close to zero using this alternative measure of political leaning. The correlation
between the two alternative measures of political leaning is 0.20, which helps to explain
why the patterns previously observed in Table 1.3 are not repeated.
What does persist throughout these regressions, however, is the finding that those
pairings who were randomly allocated to the same table at some point during the ACP on
average chose weights that were closer together than those pairings who were not assigned
to the same table. When considering the entire dataset, those pairings allocated to the
same table chose weights that were around 1.4 weighting points closer together on average
than those who were not allocated to the same table. This eﬀect remains significant at
the 5% level, even when controlling for various personal characteristics. Furthermore,
when also controlling for political leaning, based on responses to two separate questions
(and reducing the sample size accordingly in either case), those pairings who shared a
table chose weights that were generally around 3 weighting points closer together than
those assigned to diﬀerent tables. Even with the smaller sample size, and including all the
various controls, the eﬀect in these cases remains significant at the 1% level throughout.
1.5 Alternative Estimation Methods
1.5.1 Instrumental Variables Estimation
Rather than considering possible pairings of observations (as in Section 1.4), an alternative
method could be proposed, following Bramoulle et al. (2009), which takes individuals as
separate observations and asks whether players are influenced by those with whom they
shared a table, by taking the mean of all the weights chosen by these ‘table contacts’, and
including this average as a regressor.
It would be necessary in this case to use an instrumental variables (IV) specification as
opposed to ordinary least squares, because if it was assumed that participants allocated to
the same table during the ACP were influenced by one-another, then it would be possible
that the player in question also influenced the responses of each of his neighbors, meaning
that their average response would be subject to reverse causality.
Manski (1993) distinguished between three paths of possible influence across such net-
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works. ‘Correlated’ eﬀects refer to the case where players who are directly linked in a
network are more likely to behave in similar ways. Aside from this eﬀect, it is also possi-
ble to distinguish between ‘exogenous’ eﬀects, where the characteristics of each player have
an eﬀect on the behavior of those other players to whom the player is directly linked, and
‘endogenous’ eﬀects, where the behavior of each player has an influence on those around
them.
While correlated eﬀects can be ruled out in this case, thanks to the randomized nature
of the ACP seating assignment, Manski (1993) highlighted potential problems in distin-
guishing between the exogenous and endogenous eﬀects. Bramoulle et al. (2009) showed,
however, that in the absence of correlation eﬀects, it is possible to separately identify
the exogenous and endogenous eﬀects by using an instrumental variables approach under
certain conditions on the network. One such condition is that the network contains ‘in-
transitive triads’. The presence of an intransitive triad implies that you can find a player i,
who is linked to another player j, who in turn is linked to some other player k, but where
no direct link exists between players i and k. In such cases, any influence between players
i and k must come through their mutual links with player j. This makes it possible to use
the characteristics of player k as instruments for the actions of player j in explaining the
behavior of player i.
One potential advantage of such an IV specification over the dyadic models reported
in Section 1.4 is that the direction of causality is explicitly accounted for. This method
therefore identifies the eﬀect of a one-point increase in the average weight assigned to a
criterion among those players with whom each player shared a table on their own weighting
choice. This could be considered more interpretable than the eﬀect on a pairing that is
reported in dyadic regressions. Furthermore, in this case, the weights associated with each
criterion are treated in separate regressions. This oﬀers the prospect of a more detailed
breakdown of which criteria could be driving the results from the dyadic regressions, where
the dependent variable was calculated by aggregating across all 11 criteria.
A key requirement for using this estimation procedure, however, is that in such a model
the characteristics of players with whom any player i never shared a table (player k in the
illustration above) must have a strong enough impact on the behavior of player j to be
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considered a valid instrument. In this experiment, this is not found to be the case, so the
results are merely summarized here for the sake of brevity.
Table 1.5 in the Appendix shows the results of IV regressions of the form described
above, where the characteristics used to instrument the endogenous regressor (the average
weighting choice among each player’s direct table contacts) are the gender, age and edu-
cation status of those players who could have influenced the player in question via some
intransitive triad. Coeﬃcients are generally found to be positive, which could be inter-
preted as suggesting that if a player shares tables with other participants who on average
assign a higher weight to the criterion under consideration, then that player too will assign
a higher weight on average to the same criterion. In most cases, however, results are found
to be insignificant at the 5% level. More importantly, as alluded to above, the F -statistics
associated with the first-stage regressions range from 0.322 to 3.943, which suggests that
using intransitive triads in this way does not provide instruments with a suﬃcient influence
over the weighting choices of other players to provide meaningful estimates.
It is possible to conduct similar regressions, with the inclusion of additional controls for
‘cultural variables’ (as were used in Tucker and Gastil (2013)) and political leaning (both
self-reported and inferred from other survey questions). While the coeﬃcients associated
with the average weighting choice of neighbors are generally positive, which would support
the findings of the dyadic regressions reported in Section 1.4, these results are generally
not found to be statistically significant and are again based on instruments that are found
to be too weak to provide meaningful results. Detailed tables reporting these findings are
therefore omitted from this chapter.
1.5.2 Political Leaning as the Dependent Variable
This section reports the results of further regressions, whereby instead of being included as
a control variable as in the model described above, political leaning on the five-point ‘left-
right’ scale is now included as the dependent variable. The objective in such specifications
is to determine whether players’ political leaning itself was influenced by those with whom
they shared a table during the course of the ACP.
The weighting choices that have been used as dependent variables in the regressions up
to this point were recorded on the third day of the ACP, so table allocations on the final
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day of the ACP have been ignored up to now, given that they took place after weighting
choices were made. The dependent variable used in this section, however, comes from
survey responses that were given one year after the ACP. For this reason, players who
shared a table on the last day of the ACP are taken as being directly linked in the network
used here.
To state this more formally, letting xij again represent a dummy variable indicating
whether players i and j shared a table, you have:
xij =
8>><>>:
1 if T 1i = T 1j , T 2i = T 2j , T 3i = T 3j , or T 4i = T 4j
0 otherwise
By adjusting the definition of xij in this way, the average number of direct table contacts
per player rises to 20.9 (from 15.9 using only the first 3 days), with the standard deviation
rising to 1.7 (from 1.4 previously). The minimum number of direct table contacts is now
16, while the maximum is 24 (from 11 and 18 respectively).
Given that the problem of weak instruments continues to prevent the estimation of
meaningful instrumental variables regressions, attention here is once again focused on
dyadic regressions, which take each pairing as a separate observation.
The results themselves are only summarized here for the sake of brevity. Starting
with regressions using diﬀerences between self-reported political leaning as the dependent
variable, the coeﬃcient indicating the eﬀect of having shared a table is -0.03 in a regression
model with no controls included. The coeﬃcient also remains close to this level when
gender, age, education, and internet access are controlled for in subsequent regressions.
None of these results are found to be statistically significant, with t-statistics of around
0.9 in all cases.
Turning to dyadic regressions with diﬀerences between the inferred measure of political
leaning as the dependent variable, the coeﬃcient of interest is now around -0.04 both
with and without the usual controls. Again, none of these coeﬃcients are found to be
significant, with t-statistics of around 1.1.
Dyadic regressions with diﬀerences in either measure of political leaning as the depen-
dent variable therefore suggest that those pairings who shared a table are associated with
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political positions on the ‘left-right’ scale that were slightly closer together than those
pairings who were not assigned to the same table on any of the four days of the ACP.
However, regardless of which measure of political leaning is used, none of these eﬀects are
found to be significantly significant. On this basis, it is not possible to reject the null
hypothesis that table allocations have no eﬀect on either measure of political leaning.
The nature of these results is perhaps unsurprising, given the fact that ACP participants
oﬀered responses to both survey questions on political leaning a year after the completion
of the ACP meetings. For this reason, any eﬀect on political leaning coming from table
contacts would have to persist for a year to show up in these findings. It is for this reason
that political leaning as reported by either of the two measures oﬀers more practical use
as a control variable than as a dependent variable as it is being used here.
Beyond this measurement issue, it is also very plausible that while it is possible for
players to influence one-another’s decisions during discussions and debates (as the dyadic
regressions on weighting choices above might suggest), political leaning is somehow beyond
influence from others in such forums.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter has used the randomized table allocations from the Australian Citizens’
Parliament (ACP) to determine whether participants were influenced by those with whom
they shared a table during the discussions. Participants were asked to assign weights to
reflect the relative importance they attach to 11 criteria for an eﬀective political system.
By taking each possible pairing of participants and summing the diﬀerences between the
weighting choices they assigned to each of the criteria, lower values are associated with
player pairings whose weighting choices were more similar.
Results from dyadic regressions with the total diﬀerence in the weighting choices of
participants as the dependent variable suggested that participants were indeed influenced
by those with whom they shared a table. Those pairings who were randomly allocated to
the same table during any of the first three days of the ACP were found to choose weights
that were closer together than those assigned to diﬀerent tables. The size of the eﬀect in
estimations based on the entire sample is around 1.4 weighting points across all criteria.
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This implies that pairings who shared a table chose weights that were 0.13 weighting points
closer together for each individual criterion. The size of this eﬀect is found to be larger
than those associated with other pairing characteristics.
Further regressions were also conducted which used the characteristics of players who
could influence others as an instrument for their weighting choices, but instruments defined
in this way were found to be too weak to oﬀer meaningful results.
Finally, regressions which used the political leaning of participants as the dependent
variable were also estimated. Findings were inconclusive and in no case was it possible
to reject the null hypothesis that the ACP debates had no eﬀect on participants’ political
positions. Given that the data on political leaning was collected a year after the ACP,
however, it is also possible that debates did in fact influence members’ political positions
on the ‘left-right’ scale, but that this eﬀect diminishes over time.
These results show that ACP participants were able to aﬀect the opinions of others
through their debates in the ACP. This finding is therefore supportive of the role of
debate in political contexts, as well as in other social and professional contexts. The results
reported here benefit from the fact that the ACP participants were chosen at random using
stratified sampling to generate a group that is representative of the Australian population.
A group of politicians may not necessarily behave in a similar way, however, as such a
group may not be well represented by a sample of the wider population. Further work
which considers politicians themselves would therefore provide an interesting comparison
to these findings.
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Statement of Originality
This chapter expands on earlier work published in the edited book The Australian Citizens’
Parliament and the Future of Deliberative Democracy. That chapter was co-authored with
Professor John Gastil, one of the editors. Professor Gastil oﬀered me invaluable help in
understanding the dataset and the design of the original experiment in 2009. The analysis
reported in this chapter, however, is entirely my own and I received no external help in
producing these results.
Statement from Professor Gastil:
“To whom it may concern, I has been a pleasure working with Luc Tucker, but
rest assured, I am along for the ride. The piece we wrote on the Australian
Citizens’ Parliament (ACP) was his idea and method. I injected the "cultural
cognition" angle, but that’s really a matter of slotting a variable into an analysis
I had never conceived. You’re welcome to look through my record and you’ll
find nothing there with the approach Luc takes to the work. In fact, I’ve cited
him many times (including at public talks) as what an academic dreams of when
creating a big public dataset–that people will come along and find new ways of
working with the data, in the spirit of collaboration but with an approach all their
own. I’ve had a few people come along over the years promising to do so, but this
is the first such eﬀort to be published where the previously-unknown collaborator
has taken a truly original approach to the data. I wish Luc every success in his
work and am proud to have produced data that have helped advance his studies
and scholarship.”
- John Gastil, Head and Professor, Communication Arts and Sciences and Political Science,
Pennsylvania State University.
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Chapter 2
Parliamentary Questions and the
Probability of Reelection in the UK
House of Commons
2.1 Introduction
In the UK House of Commons, the daily agenda typically consists of one or more par-
liamentary debates. These debates are usually focused on a particular government de-
partment, with the ministers responsible for that department facing questions posed by
other members. As well as simply finding out the answers to their questions, such debates
oﬀer members the chance to hold the government to account for their policies, as well as
raising awareness of particular issues. Alongside these objectives, this chapter focuses on
the payoﬀs that members themselves can accrue by having their questions answered.
The present chapter exploits the institutional structure of the UK parliamentary system
to create a quasi-experiment. This approach means that this chapter can hope to infer
a causal link between the act of asking parliamentary questions and the probability of
reelection
2.1.1 UK Parliamentary Questions Procedure
Since 1989, the order in which parliamentary questions are addressed has been determined
by a random ballot (Sandford (2012)). From the pool of submitted questions, those to
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be answered are drawn in order, up to some pre-determined cut-oﬀ. This limit is chosen
as the maximum number of questions that could conceivably be reached during the time
allocated to the debate, the current maximum being 25 questions. All these questions
are placed on the ‘Order Paper’ for the debate, whereas questions not drawn among this
group are discarded.
The debate proceeds through these listed questions in numerical order, with each asking
member allowed one ‘follow-up’ question. The ‘Speaker’ presiding over the debate can also
exercise some influence over how many questions are reached on the Order Paper. In doing
so, the Speaker faces a trade-oﬀ between ensuring that each question is treated adequately,
and ensuring that as many questions as possible are given oral answers.
Given that the number of questions listed on the Order Paper is chosen as the maximum
that could potentially be answered during the time allocated to the debate, this debating
process usually results in a set of questions which are not reached, and therefore not given
an oral answer in the House of Commons. Such questions listed on the Order Paper but
not reached during the debate itself are given written answers.
There are various examples of international parliamentary systems that use random
ballots to select which questions are asked in parliamentary bodies in the event that
debates are over-subscribed (Canada and Scotland, for example, use similar ballots). A
key component of the UK system, and one that is crucial to this analysis, is the recording
of those questions not selected for direct oral answer. This facilitates the construction of
a comparable control group, against which the answered questions can be compared.
2.1.2 Oral Versus Written Questions
It can safely be assumed that Members of Parliament who listed questions for oral answer
have an interest in their questions being reached in the debate, given that the option of
submitting questions specifically for written answer is also available to them, with such
questions always guaranteed to be answered.
This can be stated more formally using an expected utility setting, where a member
who would like to ask a question in Parliament has the choice of submitting that question
for oral or written answer. Both are assumed to have the same cost (e.g. time and
preparation), denoted c. All questions submitted for written answer are guaranteed a
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written response, which can be assumed to oﬀer the member a guaranteed utility payoﬀ
Uw. This guaranteed payoﬀ is assumed to make the member exactly indiﬀerent between
submitting a written question and not doing so (Uw = c).
By submitting a question for oral answer, the member faces a probability p that their
question will be selected to go on the Order Paper. This implies a probability 1  p that
the question is not selected for the Order Paper, in which case their question receives no
answer at all. This is assumed to oﬀer the member a payoﬀ zero. If selected for the Order
Paper, the question then has a chance q of being reached in the debate. If the question
is reached, it receives an oral answer, giving a payoﬀ Uo, whereas if it is not reached, it
receives a written answer.
By choosing to submit an oral question in the first place, the member has revealed that
their expected payoﬀ from doing so is greater than the cost of doing so, and also exceeds
that of submitting a written question. This means the following two conditions must hold:
p (qUo + (1  q)Uw)   c
p (qUo + (1  q)Uw)  c   Uw   c
Given that Uw = c, these participation and incentive constraints are eﬀectively equiv-
alent, and can be rewritten as:
pUw + pq (Uo   Uw)   Uw
Given that pUw  Uw, the only way that this expression can be satisfied is if you have
Uo   Uw. Furthermore, if either p < 1 or q < 1, it must be the case that Uo > Uw. So,
if there is either any chance of not being selected for the Order Paper, or of the question
not being reached in the debate, if a member has submitted an oral question, it must be
the case that the payoﬀ to that member from having their question answered on the floor
of the House exceeds the payoﬀ from having that same question receive a written answer.
This chapter takes the preferences described above as given, assuming throughout that
members submitting questions for oral answer would prefer their questions to be reached
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in the debate, as opposed to receiving a written answer.
2.1.3 Parliamentary Questions Literature
The political science literature includes many studies regarding questions submitted in
Parliament. Martin and Rozenberg (2012) list many international examples where data
on parliamentary questions has been used make inferences about the role of legislators and
the impact that these questions may have. Saalfeld (2011) uses questions submitted in the
UK House of Commons during the 2005 Parliament to examine whether MPs with “visible-
minority” backgrounds are more likely to ask questions relating to these minorities, finding
in fact that the ethnicity of constituents plays a more prominent role. John and Bevan
(2011) consider trends in the types of questions asked during Prime Minister’s Questions
between 1997 and 2008. Using Irish data, Martin (2011) also looks in detail at the content
of questions asked in Parliament, to assess to what extent questions are focused towards
local as opposed to national issues.
Many studies have been conducted on the wider behavior of political representatives,
such as their parliamentary voting behavior. Cowley and Stuart (2008) and Cowley and
Stuart (2009) are examples which study such voting behavior in the UK case.
There is a wide literature in the area of voter responses to political behavior, even
restricting attention to the UK case. In one example, Sanders and Norris (2005) consider
the eﬀect of political advertising on voter behavior. In another related paper, Sanders et al.
(2007) consider the eﬀectiveness of internet-based surveys in predicting voter behavior.
There has been very little work in the political science literature, however, on the way in
which the political success of legislators is shaped by their behavior. An important reason
for this, is that such studies face the problem of distinguishing whether any correlation
is caused by the characteristics of politicians themselves, as opposed to their observed
behavior. An exception is Loewen et al. (2013), which uses a natural experiment in the
Canadian House of Commons to test whether political representatives who are chosen at
random to propose legislation are more likely to achieve reelection. That study is therefore
complimentary to the one presented here, in that both exploit randomizations within
parliamentary institutions to reveal ways in which constituents reward certain behavior
by their legislators.
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To my knowledge, however, there is no study which uses the randomization process with
which parliamentary questions are chosen to make inferences about their eﬀects. This may
be a result of the fact that in most international settings, the questions randomized out
according to such processes are discarded, making it impossible to use those cases as a
comparison group. Furthermore, even in the UK case there is no dataset available which
records the answered and unanswered questions in one place. This chapter combines a
number of diﬀerent sources to conduct the analysis.
The use of this randomization forms the basis of all the findings reported in this chapter.
Under an eﬀective randomization, reported results cannot be attributed to self-selection
into treatment or control groups, which in turn means that all unobserved characteristics
of the members that make up these two groups should be equivalently distributed across
the two groups.
2.1.4 Data Collection
The UK Parliament website lists the Order Papers for each day in the House of Commons
since 27 October 1997.1 This translates to three full parliamentary terms, leading up to
elections in 2001, 2005, and 2010, with the exception of the first few months following
the 1997 election.2 These Order Papers contain all the questions listed for all the debates
taking place on that day, in the order that they will be addressed, as well as a numeric
code, which is assigned to each question.
Alongside these Order Papers, the UK Parliament also publishes online transcripts for
all the debates which take place in the House of Commons on their ‘Hansard’ pages. These
transcripts contain the questions from the Order Paper that were actually asked when the
debates took place. By combining the two, it is possible to create a dataset which lists
all the questions from the Order Papers, as well as whether each of these questions was
reached within the time allocated to the debate, in which case it would have received an
oral answer.
1The Order Papers for two days, 15 July 1999 and 18 January 2002, are missing, but
of a total of 1657 days over the time period in question, these represent just 0.12% of the
dataset.
2The 1997 General Election took place on 1 May. Following the election, oral debates
restarted at the end of May, and continued through June and July. Parliament was then
in recess until 27 October, from which point Order Papers are available online.
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In 2010, the UK Parliament Library published a research paper containing a list of all
Members of Parliament, between 1979 and 2010. This paper is used to gather background
data on MPs, including gender, age, party aﬃliation and ministerial positions. The de-
pendent variable of interest (reelection) is collected from datasets compiled by the UK
Electoral Commission. In both cases, the data is matched with the data on individual
questions, based on constituency and member names.
2.1.5 Research Questions
This chapter will consider whether the act of asking parliamentary questions aﬀects the
reelection prospects of Members of Parliament (MPs) in the UK House of Commons. If
having a parliamentary question successfully chosen to be answered orally in the House
of Commons is valued by constituents, this will be reflected in their voting behavior, and
therefore the probability that the member is successful in achieving reelection.
A second related research question involves the degree to which the selection of par-
liamentary questions can truly be considered as random. In particular it is necessary to
ascertain whether the randomization in ordering questions is eﬀective in oﬀering all mem-
bers who submit questions an equal chance of having their question selected to receive an
oral answer. Questions submitted by members who are then absent from the debates are
not answered, and questions that are submitted by more than one member for the same
debate are also treated altogether. Furthermore, the number of questions answered during
the debate will depend on the speed at which the debate progresses. As all these factors
may be non-random, it may be possible for members to circumvent the randomized nature
of the debates to influence the probability that their question receives an oral answer.
Any non-randomness in the allocation to treatment and control groups (i.e. whether
the question was reached during the debate) will have to be explicitly accounted for in the
estimation methods that follow.
2.1.6 Chapter Outline
The next section of this chapter will set the scene by using a simple ordinary least squares
estimation to determine whether members who have more questions selected for oral an-
swer are more likely to be reelected. Section 2.3 will then highlight some ways in which
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the randomized procedure by which questions are selected to receive an oral answer could
be undermined. Next, Section 2.4 will propose an alternative estimation method, based
on a matched-sampling approach, which aims to address the problems posed by this en-
dogeneity in the selection of questions to be given oral answers. Section 2.5 will provide
the results from some robustness checks and the final section will outline the conclusions
of the study.
2.2 Regression Analysis Based on Individual Members
2.2.1 A Basic Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Specification
The first method used will be to take each Member of Parliament over a parliamentary
term as a single observation, and count how many times that member was successful and
unsuccessful in the ballot. The hypothesis behind such a model is that if the selection
of questions to be answered is indeed a random one, then the inclusion of the number of
unanswered questions in the regression would control for the fact that members who ask
more questions are likely to have particular characteristics, which may also influence their
probability of reelection.
In particular, once the total number of questions asked is controlled for (answered plus
unanswered), it is assumed that the number of questions answered is eﬀectively allocated
at random, and is therefore exogenous in the regression equation.
• i = 1, . . . , I is the set of Members of Parliament (MPs)
• t = 1, . . . , T is the set of elections for which data is available (2001, 2005, 2010)
• yit is a binary variable indicating whether member i was reelected in election t (de-
pendent variable)3
• ait is the number of questions asked by member i in the lead-up to election t that
received oral answers
3Throughout this study, MPs who did not seek reelection are treated in exactly the same
way as those who were unsuccessful. There is likely to be some degree of endogeneity
involved in members’ decisions as to whether to stand for reelection, with those members
who suspect they are unlikely to win being disproportionately more likely not to stand.
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• sit is the number of questions submitted by member i in the lead-up to election t that
did not receive an oral answer (not reached during the debate)
• Xit is a set of other characteristics of member i in the lead-up to election t (party,
age, gender)
• Eit is a set of dummy variables indicating which election followed the tabling of the
question
• Cit is a set of dummy variables capturing constituency fixed eﬀects
Using these definitions, the basic model can be written as:
yit =  0 +  1ait +  2sit +  3Xit +  4Eit +  5Cit + ✏it
In this model, if two members i and j share the same characteristics (sit = sjt = s,
Xit = Xjt = x, Eit = Ejt = e, Cit = Cjt = c), including the number of unanswered
questions, but member j has one more answered question than member i, you have:
E [yit | a, s, x, e, c] =  0 +  1a+  2s+  3x+  4e+  5c+ E [✏it | a, s, x, e, c]
E [yjt | a+ 1, s, x, e, c] =  0 +  1 (a+ 1) +  2s+  3x+  4e+  5c+ E [✏jt | a+ 1, s, x, e, c]
The change in the expected probability of reelection from having an extra answered
question is then given by:
E [yjt | a+ 1, s, x, e, c] E [yit | a, s, x, e, c] =  1+E [✏jt | a+ 1, s, x, e, c] E [✏it | a, s, x, e, c]
The assumption that questions are chosen at random to be answered from those on the
Order Paper implies that for any given combination of member characteristics and fixed
eﬀects, you have E [✏it | a, s, x, e, c] ⌘ E [✏it | s, x, e, c], which in turn implies that the eﬀect
of an increase in the number of questions asked by a member can be identified simply by
calculating the resulting change in the probability of reelection, conditional on the number
of unanswered questions:
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 1 = E [yjt   yit | s, x, e, c] = 4E [y | s, x, e, c]
Table 2.1 shows the results of regressions using such specifications, with standard er-
rors clustered at the member level. The first column in Table 2.1 includes no controls,
and simply calculates the eﬀect of members having an extra question answered and unan-
swered on the probability of reelection. In this simplest specification, with no controls,
results suggest that members who have one more question answered over the course of a
parliamentary term have a lower probability of being reelected.
The second column shows the results of a similar specification, but in this case including
dummy variables to control for the parliamentary term for which the total number of
questions has been calculated. After including these dummy variables, a member who
asks a higher number of parliamentary questions is found to have a higher probability
of reelection. Specifically, having an extra parliamentary question answered is found to
increase the probability of reelection by 0.18 percentage points. This is found to be very
close to significant at the 10% level, with a t-statistic of 1.64.
Columns 3 and 4 introduce some extra control variables, first for the party aﬃliation of
members, and then for various other characteristics relating to seniority and gender. The
introduction of these extra control variables slightly reduces the size of the coeﬃcient of
interest, as well as the t-statistic.
Discussion of the other coeﬃcients is kept to a minimum, as none benefit from the same
type of randomization as the one for answered questions, making it hard to infer causality.
In short, members representing the Conservative Party are found to be more likely to be
reelected. This reflects a generally increasing share of Conservative MPs in the House
of Commons over the time-period covered here, following Labour’s landslide victory in
the 1997 election. Changing parties within an electoral term is found to have a strongly
negative eﬀect on reelection prospects, as many voters presumably retain a strong loyalty
to the member’s former party (for which they were probably previously elected). Older
MPs and those with ministerial status are more likely to be reelected, but a longer period
of service reduces a member’s chances of reelection.
Column 5 includes the same set of control variables, and adds a set of dummy variables
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Table 2.1: Linear probability models estimating the eﬀect of having an extra question an-
swered in the House of Commons on a member’s probability of reelection. The dependent
variable is a binary variable indicating whether the member was reelected in the following
election (1 = ‘yes’, 0 = ‘no’), with mean = 0.752 and standard deviation = 0.432).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected
Total answered questions -0.00209⇤ 0.00176 0.00149 0.00140 0.00310⇤
(-2.24) (1.64) (1.42) (1.45) (2.11)
Total unanswered questions 0.00485⇤⇤⇤ 0.00115 0.000871 0.0000872 -0.00133
(6.04) (1.24) (0.94) (0.10) (-0.89)
Conservative Party 0.0991⇤⇤⇤ 0.0715⇤⇤ 0.276⇤⇤
(4.44) (2.99) (3.09)
Liberal Democrat Party 0.0398 -0.0259 0.111
(1.12) (-0.71) (0.74)
Other party, excluding Labour -0.108⇤ -0.0882 -0.0622
(-2.02) (-1.68) (-0.39)
Changed party -0.334⇤⇤⇤ -0.284⇤⇤ -0.196
(-3.73) (-3.04) (-1.27)
Ministerial position 0.0752⇤⇤ 0.153⇤⇤⇤
(3.11) (3.56)
Age 0.0338⇤⇤ 0.0777⇤⇤⇤
(2.88) (4.04)
Age squared -0.000387⇤⇤⇤ -0.000842⇤⇤⇤
(-3.39) (-4.70)
Years service -0.0231⇤⇤⇤ -0.0523⇤⇤⇤
(-4.65) (-6.27)
Years service squared 0.000482⇤⇤⇤ 0.000820⇤⇤⇤
(3.34) (4.08)
Female -0.0796⇤⇤ -0.0183
(-3.16) (-0.25)
Election dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constituency dummies No No No No Yes
Observations 1659 1659 1659 1659 1659
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.053 0.083 0.176 0.297
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at member level
Dataset includes all questions over three parliamentary terms, except the first few months of 1997 (see footnote)
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Figure 2.1: Total answered questions for each member in each electoral term (mean = 15.38,
standard deviation = 19.98)
to control for the constituencies that the members represent. The inclusion of these
extra controls increases the size of the coeﬃcient associated with having an extra question
answered to 0.31 percentage points. This represents a large increase in the estimated
coeﬃcient, and is also associated with a t-statistic that represents statistical significance
at the 5% level.
2.2.2 Interpretation of Initial Results
The identification strategy pursued in this section reports a coeﬃcient which calculates
the eﬀect of a member asking one extra question during a parliamentary term. Among
all the members in the sample, Figure 2.1 shows that there are many members who ask
no questions at all over the parliamentary term. By contrast, however, the maximum
number of questions successfully asked by a single MP in a parliamentary term is 174,
with a standard deviation of 19.98 questions.
The implied linear relationship reported in Table 2.1 therefore suggests that a one
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standard deviation increase in the number of questions successfully asked by an MP will
result in a 6.2 percentage point increase in the probability of reelection. This eﬀect shows
that not only is the eﬀect statistically significant, but that it is also of suﬃcient magnitude
to have a non-negligible impact on the probability of reelection.
2.2.3 A Critique of the Basic Methodology
The method employed up to this point faces the potential criticism, however, that in
certain debates questions may be more likely to be answered than in others, in a way that
violates the assumptions of the model.
For example, if one particular government department evokes a lot of interest among
members, it may be that debates related to this department generate longer questions
and answers, with more follow-up questions from other members, and therefore proceed
at a slower pace. In such debates a lower proportion of listed questions will be answered
than would be expected in other debates. If a member has a particular interest in this
department, they may submit a disproportionate number of questions for answer in these
debates. Such members would therefore be likely to see a high number of unanswered
questions, and a low number of answered questions. This would violate the assumptions
of the model above.
To address this problem, a matching-style method will be used, which in eﬀect directly
compares the reelection outcomes of members whose questions received an oral answer,
with the outcomes of members who submitted a question to be answered in the same
debate, but whose question was not reached in the allotted time.
2.3 Randomization In Practice
Throughout this chapter, much of the analysis will exploit the fact that the ordering
of questions, which in turn determines which ones are asked, is determined at random.
However, it is necessary to test the degree to which this randomization process is eﬀective.
2.3.1 Sources of Endogeneity in the Allocation to Treatment
Even with the knowledge that the ordering of questions is determined by a random draw,
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it is still potentially possible for members with a particular interest in asking a question
to influence their chances of doing so.
The first way that this could be achieved is for more than one member to agree to ask
the same question. In such cases parliamentary procedure determines that the member
with the first occurrence of a question on the Order Paper asks the question, but that
other members who submitted the same question also have a chance to ask a follow-up
question in the debate itself.
Clearly, not all cases where duplicate questions appear on the Order Paper are a result of
this type of collusion between members. If a subject is particularly topical at the time when
questions are submitted, it is also plausible to assume that members independently chose
to submit the same question to the minister responsible. Furthermore, some members
have been known to complain that their questions have been ‘grouped’ with others, when
they considered the questions to be suﬃciently distinct to warrant separate treatment.
Whatever the reasons behind such duplications, it is possible that their occurrence is
non-random, and therefore a system which treats such questions diﬀerently could have a
non-random allocation to treatment or control.
If a member is unable to attend a debate for which they have a question listed on the
Order Paper, then that question is not asked during the debate. Such non-attendance
could be correlated with the characteristics of members, as well as with their position on
the Order Paper (later questions are less likely to be reached), which means such absences
could be non-random and also create an endogenous element to the selection of questions
to receive oral responses.
Another factor which could undermine the randomness of questions answered is the
speed at which the debate is conducted. Given that each debate continues for a fixed
amount of time, the rate at which questions are answered will in turn aﬀect how many
questions are reached among those listed on the Order Paper. Any member taking part
in the debate, and particularly the minister facing the questions, may be able to exert
some control over which questions are reached. For example, a minister may provide
long-winded answers to earlier questions, in cases where they see many potentially hostile
questions from opposition party members further down the Order Paper.
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The ‘Speaker’ in charge of the debate may also play a role in the speed at which debates
are conducted. The Speaker is an elected member of Parliament, who presides over debates
in the House. The Speaker has the authority to decide which (if any) members are able to
ask supplementary questions related to those on the Order Paper, aside from the questioner
themself, and is charged with ensuring that the rules of the House are upheld. On taking
the role, the Speaker is required to sever all previous links to political parties, to ensure
their impartiality in the position.
As an unbiased member, the Speaker faces a trade-oﬀ between on one hand ensuring
that questions are answered fully, and on the other, ensuring that as many questions are
answered as possible. Through this influence, the Speaker could also potentially under-
mine the randomness with which questions are selected for oral answer in the House of
Commons.
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics Comparing Answered and Unanswered Questions
2.3.2.1 Diﬀerence-in-Means Tests Based on the Complete Dataset
Table 2.2 compares the background characteristics of MPs among those questions that
received oral answers in the House of Commons, with those among the questions that were
not reached during debates, and therefore received written answers. The final column
shows the results of t-tests looking for statistically significant diﬀerences between the
mean values of these characteristics between the two groups. In this setting, all answered
questions, duplicate or not, are treated in the same way, and questions not asked because
the member was not in attendance are treated exactly the same as all other unanswered
questions.
To be clear, given that the order of questions is determined completely at random, if
the occurrence of duplicated questions, the non-attendance of members, and the speed of
debates were not influenced by any of the members present, it should be expected that
there would be no significant diﬀerences between the averages of any of the observable
characteristics across the two groups.
Results in Table 2.2 show, however, that there are statistically significant diﬀerences
between the two groups in terms of observable characteristics. Among those questions
which are reached during the debate and therefore receive oral answers, there is a higher
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics and diﬀerence-in-means tests for the treatment and control
groups across the entire dataset. Taking each question asked as a separate data point,
the treatment group includes all questions asked in Parliament (N = 25521), whereas
the control group includes all questions submitted, but not reached during the debate
(N = 28934).
Answered questions Unanswered questions Diﬀerence
Conservative Party 0.354 0.330 0.0243⇤⇤
(3.144)
Liberal Democrat Party 0.114 0.103 0.0113⇤⇤
(3.034)
Other party, excluding Labour 0.0322 0.0336 -0.00138
(-0.522)
Changed party 0.0139 0.0108 0.00309
(1.549)
Ministerial position 0.458 0.422 0.0364⇤⇤⇤
(4.849)
Age 53.34 52.88 0.461⇤⇤⇤
(3.333)
Age squared 2924.0 2874.2 49.87⇤⇤⇤
(3.335)
Years service 11.46 10.86 0.601⇤⇤⇤
(4.107)
Years service squared 201.9 184.9 17.00⇤⇤
(3.079)
Female 0.185 0.183 0.00189
(0.355)
Observations 54455
Standard errors clustered at member level
t-statistics reported in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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proportion of opposition party members. Furthermore, among the questions that are
reached, there is a higher proportion of questions posed by members who have held a
ministerial position (defined as a position on the government or opposition front-benches
in the House of Commons). Finally, questions in the treatment group are asked on average
by older members, and members who have held oﬃce for a longer period of time.
Taken as a whole, Table 2.2 shows statistically significant diﬀerences on many of the
observable characteristics between the treatment and control groups, despite the fact that
questions are drawn and ordered completely at random.
2.3.2.2 The Cause of Observed Endogeneity
Given that it is not the main focus of this study, detailed discussions of the reasons
behind these observed diﬀerences between the treatment and control groups are left to
Chapter 3. In short, results point to the speed at which the debates progress being
endogenously determined as the main cause of the non-random allocation to treatment.
The matched sampling approach that will be introduced in Section 2.4 is found to be
eﬀective in eradicating these diﬀerences, while simultaneously ensuring that each debate
contributes an equal number of questions to the treatment and control groups in the
regressions that follow.
Specifically, results point to the Speaker being more likely to conduct debates in such
a way as to admit questions from members representing opposition parties, and who have
higher levels of authority. This is the first time that such a natural experiment has been
used to report such a finding, and warrants further attention elsewhere. The focus of the
rest of this chapter, however, will be to devise an estimation approach which addresses
this non-random element in the determination of which parliamentary questions receive
an oral answer.
2.4 Ordinary Least Squares Based on Matched Sampling
To control for the observed non-randomness in determining which parliamentary questions
receive oral answers in the UK House of Commons, a method will be used which drops
those observations most likely to be allocated to the treatment or control group in a non-
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random way. Observations are also dropped in such a way that each debate is equally
represented in the treatment and control groups. As such, this method also simultane-
ously controls for the influence that specific debates might have on outcomes, by ensuring
that any such eﬀects influence the treatment and control groups in equal measure. This
method is akin to a matching estimator (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983); LaLonde (1986);
Heckman et al. (1998); Angrist and Lavy (2001); Diamond and Sekhon (2012); Smith and
Todd (2005)), where questions in the treatment group are matched with a corresponding
question in the control group, based on the debate for which they were submitted. As
with a simple matching estimator, each observation that received the treatment (having a
question answered in this case) is eﬀectively compared to a single counterpart that did not
receive the treatment (an unanswered question), which is deemed comparable on the basis
of some observed characteristic, which in this case is the debate for which the questions
were submitted. Ho et al. (2007) propose a similar approach as a means for reducing a
model’s dependence on the parametric assumptions that are made after the data has been
“preprocessed” in this way, following related work by Rubin (1973) and Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1984).
2.4.1 Matched Sampling Methodology
Questions where the member was not present at the debate (1932 questions, or 3.5% of
the dataset) and duplicated questions (1451 questions, or 2.7% of the dataset) are not
subject to the same randomization process as other questions, so both types of question
are removed from the dataset for the results reported in this section.
After removing such cases, the matched sampling method involves dropping observa-
tions whenever there are an unequal number of questions in the treatment and control
group for a given debate. To simultaneously solve the problem of non-random allocation
to the treatment and control groups, through endogeneity in the speed at which the debate
is conducted, the questions chosen to be dropped are those closest to the cutoﬀ point (at
which the debate ended), as these are seen as the most likely to be subject to non-random
allocation to treatment or control.
This can be shown more formally as follows:
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• i represents the set of members
• d represents the set of debates
• aidt is a binary variable indicating whether the question asked in debate d by member
i received an oral answer
Let nid represent the number at which the question of member i is drawn to be asked
in the debate. Furthermore, let Nd represent the total number of questions listed on the
Order Paper for the debate. This is a subset of the total number of questions submitted
for the debate (regardless of whether they made it onto the Order Paper), itself denoted
Sd. Finally, let nd represent the number assigned to the last question reached in debate d,
i.e. the ‘cutoﬀ’ point.
Now you have:
aidt =
8>><>>:
1 if nid  nd
0 otherwise
Now, if nd > Nd/2, this means that more than half of the questions listed for answer in
debate d received an oral answer. In such cases, the last questions from the treatment group
will be dropped from the analysis. More specifically, any question such that Nd   nd <
nid  nd will be dropped from the sample if nd > Nd/2.
Conversely, if less than half of the questions listed on the Order Paper for debate d
received an oral answer (nd < Nd/2), then the first questions from the control group will
be dropped from the analysis. In particular, any question such that nd < nid  Nd   nd
will be dropped from the sample if nd < Nd/2.
To illustrate, Figure 2.2 shows the questions listed on the Order Paper for two debates,
one which proceeds fast (Debate A), and another which proceeds slowly (Debate B).
Debate A in Figure 2.2 shows the case where more than half of the questions listed on
the Order Paper are reached during the debate (7 of the 10 questions listed, illustrated as
clear boxes). If the number of questions answered in such debates is non-random (as was
shown to be the case in Section 2.4), the questions which are likely to have particular (non-
random) characteristics, are those that were reached only because the debate proceeded
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Figure 2.2: Two example debates, one where more than half the questions are answered
(nA > NA/2), and another where less than half are answered (nB < NB/2)
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quickly (questions 4 to 7 in this case). The questions at the start of the debate would
have been reached anyway, and those at the end were not reached, even though the debate
proceeded quickly. In debates where more than half of the questions are reached, the
treatment group is taken as the first questions in the debate, up to the number of questions
which matches the size of the control group (questions 1 to 3 in Debate A).
In Debate B in Figure 2.2, less than half of the questions are reached during the debate
itself, so in this case the control group is larger. In such cases, any non-randomness in
the speed at which the debate is conducted is likely to have resulted in fewer questions
being answered than would otherwise have been the case. This means that the questions
most likely to be non-random are those appearing immediately after the cutoﬀ at which
the debate ended. Again, to ensure equal numbers in the treatment and control groups,
some observations must be dropped, and in this case, it is questions immediately after the
cutoﬀ which are removed.
58
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics and diﬀerence-in-means tests for the treatment and control
groups with both groups equivalently distributed across debates. Taking each question
asked as a separate data point, the treatment group includes all questions asked in Parlia-
ment (N = 17193), whereas the control group includes questions not reached during the
debate (N = 17193).
Answered questions Unanswered questions Diﬀerence
Conservative Party 0.335 0.341 -0.00535
(-0.986)
Liberal Democrat Party 0.111 0.106 0.00465
(1.437)
Other party, excluding Labour 0.0332 0.0328 0.000349
(0.178)
Changed party 0.0132 0.0117 0.00145
(1.230)
Ministerial position 0.438 0.436 0.00279
(0.493)
Age 52.98 53.05 -0.0718
(-0.727)
Age squared 2885.5 2892.9 -7.410
(-0.696)
Years service 11.03 11.03 0.00151
(0.0158)
Years service squared 190.5 189.4 1.109
(0.305)
Female 0.187 0.186 0.000582
(0.131)
Observations 34386
Standard errors clustered at member level
t-statistics reported in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics Under Matched Sampling
Before reporting the results of the ordinary least squares estimator based on the matched
sample, it is necessary to consider whether the process of dropping observations has any ef-
fect on the comparability of the treatment and control groups, by looking at the descriptive
statistics of the two groups in terms of observable characteristics of members.
Previously in Section 2.4, when looking at the dataset as a whole, it was shown that
there were statistically significant diﬀerences between the treatment and control groups.
In particular, the questions that were reached during the debates were on average asked
more often by opposition members, with a higher average age, ministerial status, and
length of parliamentary service.
Table 2.3 shows that the process of dropping observations has resulted in the treat-
ment and control groups becoming far more comparable, with no statistically significant
diﬀerences reported between any of the observable characteristics of the members asking
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questions in either group.
This supports the claim that it is those questions closest to the cutoﬀ which are the
cause of the statistically significant diﬀerences between the two groups that were found
previously when considering the entire sample. The matched sampling approach used
here is eﬀective in eradicating those diﬀerences because it disproportionately removes the
questions closest to the cutoﬀ, which are the source of the bias.
2.4.3 Estimation Based on the Matched Sample
The first key diﬀerence between the following estimation strategy and the OLS framework
reported in Section 2.2 is that in this case each observation corresponds to a question,
as opposed to a member. The second is that in this specification, comparisons are made
between members who successfully and unsuccessfully answered questions, so the control
group is now exclusively made up of members whose questions were listed on the Order
Paper, but were not asked. Members who had no questions listed on the Order Paper
during a parliamentary term do not contribute to the findings. By contrast, in the first
specification, non-ministerial members who asked no questions during the parliament were
counted as zeros.
Once the dataset has been reduced in this way, the eﬀect of a question being asked as
opposed to receiving a written answer is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) on
the remaining observations. Formally:
• t = 1, . . . , T represents the set of elections.
• yidt is a binary variable reflecting the reelection outcome of a member i in election t,
who asked a question in debate d (dependent variable).
• qidt is a binary variable indicating whether the question of member i in debate d
received an oral answer (1), or was not reached and thus received a written answer
(0).
• Xidt is a set of control variables associated with member i at the time of debate d.
• Didt is a set of dummy variables capturing debate fixed eﬀects.
• Cidt is a set of dummy variables capturing constituency fixed eﬀects.
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Using these definitions, this model can be written as:
yidt =  0 +  1qidt +  2Xidt +  3Didt +  4Cidt + ✏idt
In this specification, given that a member i had a question selected to be placed on the
Order Paper in debate d, the probability that the question was answered is 0.5, independent
of any characteristics of the member asking the question, the constituency they represent,
or the debate for which the question was submitted. This means that any eﬀect from qidt
on the probability of reelection can be attributed to qidt itself, as opposed to any other
characteristics (observed or otherwise) associated with the observation. Some controls are
still included in the estimated regressions, however, given that they improve the precision
of the findings. Standard errors will once again be clustered at the member level in all the
results that follow.
Reducing the dataset as outlined above, but without any further controls, Table 2.4
shows that a question being reached in the debate increases the probability that the
member who asked the question was reelected in the following election by 0.42 percentage
points over another member, whose question was on the Order Paper but was not answered
(Column 1). This eﬀect is found to be far from significant at the 5% level, however, with
a t-statistic of 0.98.
The subsequent two columns (Column 2 and Column 3) each include further control
variables, first for party aﬃliation, and next for various other member characteristics. The
adjusted-R2 value jumps from zero to 0.18 after including these variables. The coeﬃcient of
interest remains close to 0.004, implying that among the answered questions the members
who posed the questions have a probability of being reelected that is 0.40 percentage points
higher than it would have been had their question appeared on the Order Paper, but too
far down the list to receive an oral answer.
After including a set of dummy variables for each of the constituencies in the sample
(Column 4), the adjusted-R2 jumps to 0.59. It is unsurprising that the inclusion of vari-
ables which control for the constituency represented by each member explains a large part
of the variation in reelection probabilities, given the strength of geographical voting norms
which exist among the UK electorate. The coeﬃcient of interest remains fairly constant
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Table 2.4: Linear probability models with reelection at the forthcoming election as the de-
pendent variable (mean = 0.823, standard deviation = 0.381), based on the sub-sample of
the dataset which ensures that the distribution of debates is equivalent across the treat-
ment and control groups. The treatment group includes questions reached in the debate,
and control group includes all questions further down the Order Paper and therefore not
asked (N = 17193 in both cases).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected
Question asked 0.00419 0.00447 0.00396 0.00428 0.00421
(0.98) (1.06) (0.99) (1.49) (1.48)
Conservative Party 0.0932⇤⇤⇤ 0.0396 0.316⇤⇤⇤ 0.370⇤⇤⇤
(3.52) (1.20) (3.86) (4.27)
Liberal Democrat Party 0.0690 -0.0171 0.434⇤⇤ 0.483⇤⇤⇤
(1.85) (-0.37) (2.96) (3.34)
Other party, excluding Labour -0.313⇤⇤⇤ -0.247⇤ -0.110 -0.0376
(-3.46) (-2.55) (-0.57) (-0.20)
Changed party -0.240 -0.145 -0.151
(-1.60) (-0.65) (-0.74)
Ministerial position 0.0680⇤ -0.0229 0.0317
(2.03) (-0.41) (0.57)
Age 0.0481⇤⇤ 0.145⇤⇤⇤ 0.134⇤⇤⇤
(3.11) (5.45) (5.44)
Age squared -0.000534⇤⇤⇤ -0.00152⇤⇤⇤ -0.00140⇤⇤⇤
(-3.44) (-6.02) (-6.02)
Years service -0.0163⇤⇤ -0.0407⇤⇤⇤ -0.0348⇤⇤⇤
(-2.78) (-4.11) (-3.54)
Years service squared 0.000305 0.000684⇤⇤ 0.000539⇤
(1.80) (2.67) (2.10)
Female -0.0830⇤⇤ -0.0686 -0.0295
(-2.95) (-0.79) (-0.36)
Constituency dummies No No No Yes Yes
Debate dummies No No No No Yes
Observations 34386 34386 34386 34386 34386
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.040 0.176 0.586 0.593
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at member level
Dataset includes all questions over three parliamentary terms, except the first few months of 1997 (see footnote)
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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at just over 0.004, but is not found to be statistically significant at the 5% level, with a
t-statistic of 1.49.
The inclusion of a set of dummy variables controlling for debate-specific eﬀects has
very little eﬀect on the adjusted-R2 (Column 5). This in unsurprising, given that the
matched sampling approach used here to remove those questions most likely to have been
allocated to treatment or control in a non-random way, also implies that each debate is
equally represented in the treatment and control groups. The eﬀects of individual debates
is therefore already being controlled for through the model specification, which means that
the inclusion of debate-fixed eﬀects adds little to the explanatory power of the model.
2.4.4 Interpretation of Findings
Results from this adapted matched sampling model show that after controlling for member
characteristics, as well as fixed eﬀects associated with constituencies and debates, the eﬀect
of having a question answered, as opposed to being placed on the Order Paper, but not
being reached and therefore remaining unanswered, is to increase the member’s probability
of reelection by 0.42 percentage points.
The control group here consists of questions listed on the Order Paper which did not
receive an oral answer. When interpreting these reported findings, it is therefore the
diﬀerence between the number of answered and unanswered questions which is of interest.
In this sense, the most successful member in the dataset over the course of an electoral
term had 174 questions answered, compared with 94 unanswered, implying a diﬀerence of
+80 questions. Conversely, the most unsuccessful member only had 35 questions answered,
compared with 100 questions unanswered, implying a diﬀerence of -65 questions. Figure
2.3 plots all such diﬀerences across all members and all electoral terms.
The standard deviation associated with the number of answered minus unanswered
questions across all the members is 11.05 questions. A coeﬃcient of 0.004 therefore implies
that a member who has a number of answered minus unanswered questions one standard
deviation higher than another member should expect to have their chances of reelection
increased by 4.6 percentage points.
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Figure 2.3: Answered questions minus unanswered questions for each member in each elec-
toral term (mean = -2.06, standard deviation = 11.05)
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2.5 Extensions and Robustness Checks
2.5.1 The Complete Dataset
Given that the method employed in Section 2.4 involves dropping some observations, it
is informative to consider whether the results would have been aﬀected if the dataset had
not been reduced in this way.
Results in Table 2.4 showed a positive relationship between having questions answered
as opposed to unanswered, although the eﬀect was not found to be statistically significant
at the 5% level. It is possible to run a similar analysis, but without dropping observations
in the same way. These specifications rely on a set of dummy variables capturing debate
fixed eﬀects to control for the eﬀects of diﬀerent debates. However, the benefits from the
larger dataset come at the price of including those observations deemed most likely to be
allocated to the treatment or control group in a non-random way.
For the sake of brevity, the results are left to the Appendix, where Table 2.5 reports
the results of similar regressions as those in Table 2.4, but based on the entire dataset. In
short, these specifications show that the results reported in Table 2.4 are not reliant on
the use of the matched sampling approach, and are equally evident when considering the
dataset as a whole. Once all control variables are included in the specification, questions
that receive an oral answer are found to be asked by members who are 0.40 percentage
points more likely to be reelected, as opposed to those questions that appeared on the
Order Paper but were not asked. This eﬀect is roughly equivalent to the one found when
the dataset was reduced under the previous matched sampling approach. Furthermore,
owing to the fact that this finding is based on a larger sample size, this result is found to
be statistically significant at the 10% level, with a t-statistic of 1.69.
2.5.2 Intention-to-Treat Specifications
An alternative method for which results are robust to any potential non-randomness in
the selection of questions to receive an oral answer is to use an ‘intention-to-treat’ (ITT)
specification. Again, this specification is based on the full dataset where each observation
corresponds to a parliamentary question.
If a question appears towards the top of the Order Paper (a ‘low-numbered’ question),
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it is taken as part of the treatment group in this model, whereas any question further down
the Order Paper is placed in the control group (a ‘high-numbered’ question). Across all
the debates recorded in the dataset, 47% of the questions listed on the Order Paper receive
oral answers. In this ITT analysis, the first 47% of questions in each debate are therefore
counted as ‘low-numbered’, with all the remaining questions marked as ‘high-numbered’.
Given that the position of a question on the Order Paper cannot be influenced by any of
the participants in the debate, this allocation is truly exogenous.
Results listed in Table 2.6 in the Appendix show a consistently positive eﬀect from
having a ‘low-numbered’ question on the Order Paper, as opposed to a ‘high-numbered’
question. The eﬀect is found to be smaller than the estimated eﬀect from Tables 2.4 and
2.5 of actually having a question answered, however. With all controls included, questions
that are assigned a low number on the Order Paper are found to be asked by members who
are 0.16 percentage points more likely to be reelected. While these results are far from
statistically significant, they continue to suggest a positive relationship between members’
randomly allocated positions on the Order Paper and their subsequent probability of
reelection.
2.5.3 The Ordinary Least Squares Specification Based on the Reduced Sam-
ple
A final robustness check involves running the basic ordinary least squares specification pro-
posed in Section 2.2 but using the reduced dataset from the matched sampling approach.
The results are again left to the Appendix (Table 2.7), and show a slightly larger positive
eﬀect eﬀect than was found originally when counting all questions from the entire sample.
Specifically, once all controls are included, the act of asking an extra parliamentary ques-
tion is found to increase a member’s probability of reelection by 0.32 percentage points,
whereas the eﬀect was estimated as 0.31 percentage points in Section 2.2. Furthermore,
this eﬀect is again found to be statistically significant at the 5% level, with an associated
t-statistic of 2.11.
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter aimed to test whether the asking of oral parliamentary questions in the
House of Commons increases a member’s probability of being reelected to Parliament in
the following election.
The way in which constituents choose their political representatives is of great interest
to social scientists. Economists should be particularly interested in the degree to which
legislators have an incentive to partake in day-to-day parliamentary business. The rela-
tionship between a political representative and their constituents can be thought of in a
principal-agent setting, where constituents observe some proportion (or signal) of the work
of their representative over a parliamentary term before choosing whether to reelect them
for the following term. A crucial part of this relationship is whether constituents can be
shown to reward parliamentary activity in their voting behavior.
While many previous studies have considered the eﬀect of legislator behavior on elec-
tion outcomes, none have considered the impact of asking parliamentary questions on
reelection chances. A key reason for this is that members who ask many parliamentary
questions are likely to have particular characteristics, which may be unobservable. A study
which does not address this issue would not be able to separate the eﬀect of members’
parliamentary activity from the eﬀect of these unobservable characteristics on reelection
outcomes. By exploiting a natural experiment within the institutional structure of the
House of Commons, this chapter is able to rule out the impact of unobservable character-
istics by assuming them to be equally distributed among the treatment and control groups,
and therefore makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of the relationship in
question.
The identification strategy used to answer this question relied on the randomized way
in which parliamentary questions are ordered, which in turn aﬀects their probability of
receiving an oral answer. In particular, members wishing to ask a parliamentary question
are invited to submit their questions ahead of the debate. Once submitted, a random ballot
is used to determine which of these questions appear on the Order Paper, and the order in
which they will be answered. This ballot has a direct eﬀect on which questions receive an
oral answer, because time constraints usually dictate that only the first questions listed
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on the Order Paper will be reached during the time allotted to the debate.
A basic ordinary least squares specification counting the number of answered and unan-
swered questions for each MP over each parliamentary term revealed that after controlling
for the number of unanswered questions, members with a higher number of answered
questions were more likely to be reelected in the following election.
While the ordering of questions is determined at random, this finding relies on the idea
that each time a member’s question appears on the Order Paper, there is an equal (or at
least exogenous) chance that their question receives an oral answer. One way in which
this assumption could potentially be violated would be if any of the debate participants,
including the Speaker, exerted some control over the speed at which debates progressed,
and therefore the number of questions that received an oral answer in debates.
In fact it has been shown that there exist some statistically significant diﬀerences be-
tween the observable characteristics of the members whose questions receive an oral an-
swer, and those members whose questions are selected to be placed on the Order Paper
for debates, but are not reached and therefore receive written answers. Further analysis in
Chapter 3 has been conducted into the reasons behind these diﬀerences. Results suggest
that the influence of the Speaker plays a key role.
To account for this non-random element in determining whether questions are answered,
a matched sampling approach was adopted, which dropped those observations most likely
to have been allocated to the treatment or control group in a non-random way. The
method also ensures that debates are equally distributed across the treatment and control
groups, which implies that once a member’s question is listed on the Order Paper, it
has a probability of being answered of 0.5. By comparing means across the same set
of observable characteristics between the treatment and control groups (answered and
unanswered questions), it was shown that this matched sampling approach was successful
in eliminating the statistically significant diﬀerences between the two parts of the sample.
Using this reduced sample, it was possible to estimate the eﬀect on reelection probability
of having a question answered in Parliament, as opposed to submitting a question which
was not reached during the debate (and instead received a written answer).
Results again showed a positive relationship between having questions answered in
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Parliament and the probability of reelection, of the same order of magnitude as was found
under the basic ordinary least squares estimation. To ensure that this positive result was
not caused by reducing the sample in this way, a similar analysis was conducted using the
entire dataset, and found the results unchanged. While the size of the eﬀect was reduced
under an intention-to-treat (ITT) specification, the results remained positive under all
combinations of control variables.
This chapter says nothing about the paths of such influence and this could be a topic
for future research. While debates are televised, it seems implausible to imagine that
a substantial proportion of the electorate would watch these debates directly. It seems
more likely that the media has an important role to play, for example through local
newspapers reporting the actions of legislators at the national level. Personal networks
within the constituency could also play an important role. As an example, a constituent
may raise a very specific concern to their local MP, who might then choose to pursue the
issue at the national level by posing the question directly to the minister responsible. In
such cases, while the issue itself may be narrow and therefore not deemed newsworthy,
other constituents who hear of this episode via word-of-mouth may be heartened by the
legislator’s willingness to pursue the issue. Such sentiments could then be reflected in
election outcomes.
To summarize, the motivation of this chapter was to exploit a natural experiment
brought about by the institutional structure in the House of Commons, to determine
whether members who ask parliamentary questions are more likely to be reelected by their
constituents. Initial results found this to be the case, and significantly so, but faced the
potential criticism that the randomization process could potentially have been undermined.
A matched sampling approach was used to reduce the dataset to those observations least
likely to have been aﬀected by any non-random allocation to the treatment or control
group. This was shown to result in a dataset where the treatment and control groups
were comparable in terms of all observable characteristics, as should be expected under a
randomization. Results based on this reduced sample were found to support the original
finding.
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Table 2.5: Regressions controlling for debate fixed eﬀects, counting each question (answered
or unanswered) as an observation, based on the whole sample. The dependent variable is
a binary variable indicating whether the member asking the question was reelected in the
following election, with mean = 0.820 and standard deviation = 0.384.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected
Question asked -0.0194⇤⇤ 0.00615 0.00512 0.00486 0.00396
(-3.01) (1.72) (1.46) (1.46) (1.69)
Conservative Party 0.119⇤⇤⇤ 0.0496 0.342⇤⇤⇤
(4.26) (1.46) (3.92)
Liberal Democrat Party 0.0949⇤ -0.0104 0.411⇤⇤
(2.53) (-0.23) (2.76)
Other party, excluding Labour -0.303⇤⇤⇤ -0.244⇤⇤ -0.0593
(-3.62) (-2.70) (-0.33)
Changed party -0.236 -0.162
(-1.87) (-0.81)
Ministerial position 0.0907⇤⇤ 0.0294
(2.80) (0.53)
Age 0.0422⇤⇤ 0.137⇤⇤⇤
(2.92) (5.58)
Age squared -0.000471⇤⇤ -0.00143⇤⇤⇤
(-3.26) (-6.17)
Years service -0.0104 -0.0365⇤⇤⇤
(-1.79) (-3.68)
Years service squared 0.000150 0.000599⇤
(0.88) (2.34)
Female -0.0695⇤⇤ -0.0139
(-2.59) (-0.17)
Debate dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constituency dummies No No No No Yes
Observations 54455 54455 54455 54455 54455
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.054 0.101 0.209 0.598
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at member level
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 2.6: Linear probability models estimating the eﬀect of having a question high up the
Order Paper (likely to be answered), as opposed to a question lower down the Order Paper
(unlikely to be answered) on the probability of reelection. This represents an ‘intention-
to-treat’ (ITT) model, where reelection is captured by a binary variable, with mean =
0.820, standard deviation = 0.384.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected
Low-numbered question 0.00559 0.00526 0.00203 0.00186 0.00163
(1.55) (1.49) (0.64) (0.82) (0.74)
Conservative Party 0.0962⇤⇤⇤ 0.0417 0.292⇤⇤⇤ 0.342⇤⇤⇤
(3.52) (1.28) (3.59) (3.92)
Liberal Democrat Party 0.0690 -0.0187 0.367⇤ 0.411⇤⇤
(1.74) (-0.39) (2.44) (2.76)
Other party, excluding Labour -0.323⇤⇤⇤ -0.253⇤⇤ -0.124 -0.0593
(-3.68) (-2.66) (-0.66) (-0.33)
Changed party -0.255 -0.154 -0.162
(-1.80) (-0.72) (-0.81)
Ministerial position 0.0672⇤ -0.0151 0.0295
(2.03) (-0.27) (0.53)
Age 0.0477⇤⇤ 0.147⇤⇤⇤ 0.137⇤⇤⇤
(3.05) (5.59) (5.58)
Age squared -0.000530⇤⇤⇤ -0.00154⇤⇤⇤ -0.00143⇤⇤⇤
(-3.38) (-6.16) (-6.17)
Years service -0.0162⇤⇤ -0.0418⇤⇤⇤ -0.0365⇤⇤⇤
(-2.74) (-4.27) (-3.68)
Years service squared 0.000298 0.000729⇤⇤ 0.000600⇤
(1.73) (2.91) (2.34)
Female -0.0851⇤⇤ -0.0487 -0.0138
(-2.98) (-0.58) (-0.17)
Constituency dummies No No No Yes Yes
Debate dummies No No No No Yes
Observations 54455 54455 54455 54455 54455
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.042 0.177 0.593 0.598
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at member level
Dataset includes all questions over three parliamentary terms, except the first few months of 1997 (see footnote)
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 2.7: Linear probability models estimating the eﬀect of having an extra question
answered in the House of Commons on a member’s probability of reelection (mean =
0.752, standard deviation = 0.432). Estimates here are based on the dataset which counts
only those questions which were used under the matched sampling approach.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected
Total answered questions -0.00213⇤ 0.00182 0.00155 0.00143 0.00319⇤
(-2.29) (1.70) (1.46) (1.47) (2.16)
Total unanswered questions 0.00482⇤⇤⇤ 0.00102 0.000752 0.0000495 -0.00136
(6.01) (1.10) (0.82) (0.05) (-0.90)
Conservative Party 0.102⇤⇤⇤ 0.0697⇤⇤ 0.281⇤⇤
(4.56) (2.90) (3.15)
Liberal Democrat Party 0.0367 -0.0277 0.116
(1.03) (-0.76) (0.77)
Other party, excluding Labour -0.108⇤ -0.0882 -0.0610
(-2.01) (-1.68) (-0.38)
Changed party -0.317⇤⇤⇤ -0.271⇤⇤ -0.197
(-3.40) (-2.77) (-1.27)
Ministerial position 0.0791⇤⇤ 0.154⇤⇤⇤
(3.25) (3.50)
Age 0.0340⇤⇤ 0.0775⇤⇤⇤
(2.90) (3.97)
Age squared -0.000389⇤⇤⇤ -0.000839⇤⇤⇤
(-3.41) (-4.61)
Years service -0.0243⇤⇤⇤ -0.0533⇤⇤⇤
(-4.89) (-6.35)
Years service squared 0.000532⇤⇤⇤ 0.000858⇤⇤⇤
(3.68) (4.24)
Female -0.0831⇤⇤ -0.0168
(-3.26) (-0.23)
Election dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constituency dummies No No No No Yes
Observations 1632 1632 1632 1632 1632
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.054 0.083 0.174 0.289
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at member level
Dataset includes all questions over three parliamentary terms, except the first few months of 1997 (see footnote)
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
76
Chapter 3
Is the Speaker Biased in the UK House
of Commons?
3.1 Introduction
“The Speaker must be above party political controversy and must be seen to be completely
impartial in all public matters. All sides in the House rely on the Speaker’s disinterest, and
understand that he or she must stand aside from controversy.”
- House of Commons Information Oﬃce
In the UK House of Commons, Members of Parliament (MPs) submit questions which they
hope to put to the minister responsible during oral debates. From this list of submitted
questions, a number are chosen to be placed on the ‘Order Paper’, which is a document
listing all the questions tabled for debate on a given day. The choice as to which questions
are placed on the Order Paper and the order in which they appear is determined by a
random ballot. The remaining questions are discarded. The number of questions admitted
to the Order Paper is set as the maximum number of questions that could be expected
to be reached in the time allocated to the debate. In practice this means that in most
debates not all listed questions are reached. All questions not reached receive written
responses. The ordering of questions as determined by the ballot is therefore important in
that questions ‘higher up’ the Order Paper (i.e. those with lower question numbers) are
more likely to receive an oral response in the House of Commons.
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A House of Commons Factsheet says “This ballot, or shuﬄe, is a lottery and blind to
considerations of party, seniority, method of tabling, time of submission or the results of
previous shuﬄes.” The shuﬄe is therefore in place to ensure that all members have a
fair chance of having their questions receive an oral answer. The practicalities associated
with conducting debates, however, mean that it could be the case that participants in the
debates are still able to influence the probability that certain questions receive oral answers.
This chapter will assess the extent to which the ballot procedure is eﬀective in ensuring
that members submitting questions have a fair chance of having their questions answered.
This will be achieved by comparing the observable characteristics of the members whose
questions are answered with those of the members whose questions are not reached and
therefore receive written answers.
Given that this ordering is determined completely at random, it should be expected
that the answered and unanswered questions in each debate have similar characteristics
on average. As such this chapter exploits a ‘natural experiment’ in the UK parliamentary
process. In particular, because the system is designed to ensure that questions are chosen
to be answered by a random process, any observed diﬀerences between the characteristics
of members whose questions are and are not answered orally in the House must mean that
the randomization is being undermined in some way.
3.1.1 Previous Related Studies
In the UK political environment, there have long been concerns raised by members of
the main political parties regarding fair treatment in Parliament. These are important
questions in maintaining the credibility of a legislature, as any evidence of bias in a parlia-
mentary chamber could be potentially damaging to its reputation. The Speaker is required
to renounce any previous aﬃliation to a political party on taking the position in order to
conduct the role with impartiality. This position in particular has led to a number of
complaints from members believing they are not being treated fairly.
In 2000, the Speaker was accused of bias against the Conservative Party by intervening
to prevent a question being asked regarding the Labour Party leadership. More recently
(since 2011) the Conservative MP Rob Wilson has cited data on the number of interven-
tions against members of each of the main UK political parties to accuse the Speaker of
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bias against the Conservative Party. Neither of these claims, however, made use of the
kind of ‘natural experiment’ that this chapter is able to exploit. By simply comparing the
number of interventions against a political party, for example, it is not possible to rule
out the possibility that the members of the political party for which the most interven-
tions were observed had some particular characteristics which caused this high number of
interventions and were not shared by the other parties. Following such accusations, this
chapter will pay particular attention to the role of the Speakers which have served in the
UK House of Commons over the time period under consideration.
In testing impartiality, this chapter is also related to an extensive literature analyzing
the impartiality of sports referees. Parsons et al. (2011) and Price and Wolfers (2010)
examine the behavior of referees towards diﬀerent racial groups, finding in both cases that
referees penalize players from other racial groups more heavily than those of their own
racial group. Garicano et al. (2005), Sutter and Kocher (2004) and Dohmen (2008) all
find that soccer referees show a bias towards the team playing in their home stadium.
Rickman and Witt (2008) also showed that such eﬀects could be mitigated using financial
incentives. The Speaker’s role as an arbitrator can be likened to that of an impartial
referee facing social pressure in the House of Commons chamber and as such this chapter
oﬀers a contribution to this literature by testing for impartiality in a political as opposed
to sporting context.
3.1.2 Data
This chapter uses data on debates in the UK Parliament across three parliamentary terms
since 27 October 1997. The dataset includes all the parliamentary questions listed for oral
answer for each day in which Parliament was sitting (those listed on the Order Paper) up
to the 2010 General Election.1 Among these questions, it is possible to refer to debate
transcripts to determine which questions received oral answers in the debates themselves.
All questions not reached during the debates instead received written answers. Since this
study focuses only on questions answered orally and to avoid confusion, such questions
are referred to as simply being ‘unanswered’.
Data on the background characteristics of MPs, including party aﬃliation, age and
1Except two days, for which the Order Papers are missing.
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gender, are all sourced from a research paper published by the House of Commons Library
in 2010 which listed the characteristics of all MPs from 1979 to 2010.
3.2 Estimation
Under an eﬀective randomization, among the questions which are reached during debates
and therefore receive oral answers, members should have the same characteristics on av-
erage as those not reached, as there would be no way for any participant to influence
whether their question was answered or unanswered. To determine whether this is in fact
the case, simple ‘diﬀerence-in-means’ tests will be reported, which take the mean values
of a number of observed characteristics across the two groups of questions (those that do
and do not receive oral answers). The tests then take the diﬀerence between these two
mean values across each of the observed characteristics and then calculate t-statistics for
each of these observed diﬀerences to determine whether each diﬀerence can be viewed as
‘statistically significant’.
The t-statistics reported in the following tables are calculated using standard errors
which account for the fact that single members often ask multiple questions in the dataset.
In particular, standard errors are clustered at the member-level.
3.2.1 Comparing Answered and Unanswered Questions
Table 3.1 shows the results of diﬀerence-in-means tests comparing the characteristics of the
members whose questions received oral answers with those members whose questions were
not reached and therefore received written answers. The first column reports the average
values of each of the observed characteristics among the questions which received oral
answers (the ‘treatment group’). The second column reports the corresponding averages
among the questions which did not receive oral responses, as they appeared too far down
the Order Paper to be reached during the time allotted to their debate (the ‘control
group’). The third column reports the diﬀerence between these two values, as well as the
t-statistics associated with each of these diﬀerences. A positive reported diﬀerence implies
that the average was higher among the answered as opposed to unanswered questions. The
t-statistics can then be compared to the associated critical values of the t-distribution to
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Table 3.1: Diﬀerence-in-means tests between the average characteristics of members whose
questions received oral answers in the House of Commons (Na = 25521) and those that
were not reached during the debates (Nu = 28934) and therefore received written an-
swers. The first column takes all the questions which received oral answers (the ‘treat-
ment group’) and reports the mean characteristics among the members who asked each of
those questions. The second column gives the corresponding mean characteristics among
the questions which did not receive oral answers (‘the control group’). The final column
reports the diﬀerence between these means.
Answered questions Unanswered questions Diﬀerence
Conservative Party 0.354 0.330 0.0243⇤⇤
(3.144)
Lib. Dem. Party 0.114 0.103 0.0113⇤⇤
(3.034)
Changed party 0.0139 0.0108 0.00309
(1.549)
Ministerial position 0.458 0.422 0.0364⇤⇤⇤
(4.849)
Age 53.34 52.88 0.461⇤⇤⇤
(3.333)
Age squared 2924.0 2874.2 49.87⇤⇤⇤
(3.335)
Years service 11.46 10.86 0.601⇤⇤⇤
(4.107)
Years svc. sqrd. 201.9 184.9 17.00⇤⇤
(3.079)
Female 0.185 0.183 0.00189
(0.355)
Observations 54455
Standard errors clustered at member level
t-statistics reported in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
infer whether the results can be interpreted as suﬃciently diﬀerent from zero to be treated
as statistically significant. Such results are marked with stars.
Comparing the first two columns in Table 3.1, as well as the third column reporting the
diﬀerences, it is clear that there exist statistically significant diﬀerences between almost
all of the characteristics of the members whose questions received oral answers and those
whose questions did not get answered. Among the questions which are answered, a higher
proportion are found to be asked by opposition party members than among those questions
which do not receive an oral answer. This suggests that in cases where they have a
question selected for the Order Paper, members of both of the main opposition parties
are more likely to have their question answered than would be expected under an eﬀective
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randomization.
Among the answered questions, 45.8% are found to have been asked by members who
achieved a ministerial position at some point before 2010. By contrast, among the unan-
swered questions, 42.2% were found to have been asked by members who achieved ministe-
rial positions. This diﬀerence of 3.6 percentage points is found to be statistically significant
at the 0.1% level. Similarly, among the answered questions, the average age of the mem-
bers posing the questions is found to be 0.46 years higher than among the unanswered
questions and likewise among the answered questions, the members asking the questions
were found to have served 0.60 more years in Parliament than those members whose ques-
tions went unanswered. Both of these results are highly significant, and suggest that older
and more senior members who have questions selected for the Order Paper are more likely
to have their questions answered than would be expected if the randomization was being
eﬀectively applied.
Female members were also found to have their questions answered more often than
would be expected under a true randomization, although the diﬀerence is small and not
found to be statistically significant.
Overall, these results suggest that the randomization is being undermined in some way
and the following sections will aim to determine exactly why this is the case.
3.2.2 Within-Debate Intention-to-Treat Comparisons
Table 3.1 takes no explicit account of duplicated questions and questions asked by members
who were not present at the debate. In fact, parliamentary procedure determines that these
questions will be treated diﬀerently from other questions, in a way which could undermine
the randomness of the ballot system. Specifically, duplicated questions are grouped to be
answered together and questions where the member is not present are left unanswered,
regardless of their position on the Order Paper.
To check that it is not the treatment of such questions which is causing the statistically
significant diﬀerences reported in Table 3.1, similar diﬀerence-in-means tests are conducted
on the same dataset, but using an intention-to-treat analysis. In particular, this process
simply counts the number of parliamentary questions asked in each debate and assumes
that the first questions listed on the Order Paper up to that number were answered in
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Table 3.2: Diﬀerence-in-means tests between the questions which likely received oral answers
in the House of Commons (Na = 25521) and those that were likely not reached during the
debates (Nu = 28934), based on their position on the Order Paper. If a questions were
answered in a debate, the first a questions are placed in the treatment group, regardless of
whether they received an answer. The first column reports the mean characteristics among
the members whose questions were higher up the Order Paper and therefore likely received
an oral answer (the ‘treatment group’). The second column gives the corresponding mean
characteristics among the questions which were lower down the Order Paper and therefore
likely did not receive oral answers (the ‘control group’). The final column reports the
diﬀerence between these means.
Likely answered questions Likely unanswered questions Diﬀerence
Conservative Party 0.349 0.334 0.0148⇤
(2.124)
Lib. Dem. Party 0.115 0.102 0.0135⇤⇤⇤
(3.372)
Changed party 0.0138 0.0109 0.00287
(1.441)
Ministerial position 0.458 0.423 0.0349⇤⇤⇤
(5.010)
Age 53.33 52.89 0.436⇤⇤⇤
(3.318)
Age squared 2922.4 2875.6 46.84⇤⇤⇤
(3.337)
Years service 11.44 10.87 0.575⇤⇤⇤
(4.097)
Years svc. sqrd. 200.4 186.2 14.20⇤⇤
(2.693)
Female 0.186 0.183 0.00300
(0.618)
Observations 54455
Standard errors clustered at member level
t-statistics reported in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
the debate. Under this method, if a questions are answered orally in a debate, the first a
questions on the Order Paper for that debate are placed into the ‘treatment group’ (first
column). The remaining u questions in the debate are then placed into the ‘control group’
(second column). In this case, questions are allocated to the treatment and control groups
based on their position on the Order Paper and the number of questions reached during
each debate. Any diﬀerences which persist between the two groups cannot be attributed
to the treatment of duplicate questions, or questions not answered because the member
was not present, because in this test such questions are treated in exactly the same way
as all others.
Conservative Party members are again found more frequently in the ‘treatment group’ of
low-numbered questions than would be expected under a true randomization, although the
83
diﬀerence is slightly smaller than the one reported between the corresponding treatment
and control groups in Table 3.1. A higher proportion of Liberal Democrat MPs are also
found among the low-numbered questions as opposed to the high-numbered (and therefore
likely unanswered) ones. This eﬀect is even larger than the one reported previously and
is statistically significant at the 0.1% level.
Members who held ministerial positions, older members, and those with more years
of service were again found to be more prevalent among the ‘treatment group’ of low-
numbered questions, with reported diﬀerences being of a similar magnitude to those re-
ported in Table 3.1 (where answered and unanswered questions were compared directly)
and again are found to be statistically significant.
Overall, results in Table 3.2 show that the statistically significant diﬀerences persist even
in such an intention-to-treat setting. This means it is possible to rule out the notion that
it is the non-random treatment of duplicated questions or those asked by absent members
that creates the statistically significant diﬀerences between the observed characteristics of
the two groups.
3.2.3 Across-Debate Intention-to-Treat Comparisons
The remaining possible explanation for these observed diﬀerences between the two groups
is an endogeneity associated with the speed at which debates progress. Firstly, if members
know before submitting a question which debates will progress quickly, they will be able to
influence their probability of asking a question, in the event that their question is selected
for the Order Paper, by submitting questions to debates in which they expect a high
proportion of questions on the Order Paper to be answered. Secondly, once all questions
are submitted and the ballot has taken place, members taking part in the debate, including
the Speaker, may be able to influence how many questions are answered by controlling
the speed at which the debate progresses.
If either of these were the cause of the diﬀerences between the two groups, it would
be expected that the diﬀerences would disappear under an intention-to-treat specification
which assumed that the same proportion of questions were reached across all the debates
in the dataset.
Across all debates in the dataset, 46.9% of questions receive an oral answer. In the
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Table 3.3: Diﬀerence-in-means tests between the questions which likely received oral answers
in the House of Commons (Na = 24128) and those that were likely not reached during
the debates (Nu = 30327), assuming that a constant proportion of questions listed on the
Order Paper received an answer across all debates. Any question numbered q in a debate
will be placed in the treatment group if q < 0.469⇥(a+ u), regardless of whether it received
an answer. The first column reports the mean characteristics among the members whose
questions were higher up the Order Paper and therefore likely received an oral answer
(the ‘treatment group’). The second column gives the corresponding mean characteristics
among the questions which were lower down the Order Paper and therefore likely did not
receive oral answers (the ‘control group’). The final column reports the diﬀerence between
these means.
Likely answered questions Likely unanswered questions Diﬀerence
Conservative Party 0.338 0.344 -0.00613
(-1.415)
Lib. Dem. Party 0.111 0.106 0.00507
(1.660)
Changed party 0.0129 0.0118 0.00112
(1.190)
Ministerial position 0.440 0.438 0.00228
(0.510)
Age 52.95 53.21 -0.264⇤⇤
(-3.180)
Age squared 2881.5 2910.3 -28.78⇤⇤
(-3.163)
Years service 11.07 11.20 -0.130
(-1.559)
Years svc. sqrd. 190.5 194.8 -4.312
(-1.286)
Female 0.184 0.185 -0.000933
(-0.262)
Observations 54455
Standard errors clustered at member level
t-statistics reported in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
analysis that follows, it is assumed that this proportion of questions is answered in each
debate. On an Order Paper with questions numbered 1, . . . , a + u, if a question has a
number q such that q < 0.469⇥ (a+ u) it is therefore placed in the ‘treatment group’ (i.e.
it is likely to have received an answer), otherwise it is placed in the ‘control group’.
By comparing the means of the observable characteristics across the two groups defined
in this way, most of the previously-reported diﬀerences between the treatment and control
groups in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 disappear. Neither Conservative nor Liberal Democrat mem-
bers are found to be more likely to have their questions in the proportion of the Order
Paper where they are likely to be answered orally. Similarly, neither members holding
ministerial positions, nor those with many years of parliamentary service are found to
have their questions appearing more often towards the top of the Order Paper.
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The only case in which statistically significant diﬀerences are found is between the
average age of the two groups. In this case, however, it is found that the average age
among the questions in the ‘control group’ (likely unanswered) are higher than among the
‘treatment group’. This is the opposite to the results in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
These results therefore generally confirm that the randomization itself was eﬀective
in oﬀering equal opportunities for all members to pose oral questions in the House of
Commons and cannot be held responsible for the observed diﬀerences in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
It has been shown that when the speed at which debates are conducted (and therefore the
proportion of listed questions admitted) is held constant, characteristics are very similar
across the ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups. The findings therefore point to a manipulation
of this speed at which debates are conducted as the reason behind the observed diﬀerences
between the members whose questions are answered and unanswered.
3.3 The Role of the Speaker
The analysis presented in the previous section points to an endogeneity associated with
the speed at which debates progress as the reason behind the diﬀerences in observed char-
acteristics between the members whose questions are answered and those whose questions
remain unanswered. To find out to what extent these diﬀerences can be attributed to
the role of the Speaker, further diﬀerence-in-means tests will be conducted which compare
only those questions which are marginally admitted or left out of the debate.
The reason for making this comparison is that while members submitting questions
may have some knowledge of the debates in which a high proportion of the questions on
the Order Paper will be reached, it can safely be assumed that they will not be able to
predict exactly which question listed on the Order Paper for a debate will be the last
question admitted. This implies that members will not be able to influence whether they
fall into the treatment or control group in this comparison. On an Order Paper with a
answered and u unanswered questions numbered 1, . . . , a+ u, they will therefore have as
much probability of their question being the question numbered a (the last one answered),
as the question numbered a + 1 (the first one unanswered). This makes allocation to
treatment or control group ex ante exogenous in this case. If diﬀerences between the
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Table 3.4: Diﬀerence-in-means tests between the characteristics of the members whose ques-
tions were the last ones to receive oral answers in House of Commons debates (Na = 2588)
and the corresponding characteristics of members whose questions were the first ones that
were not reached during the debates and therefore received written answers (Nu = 2588).
The first column reports the mean characteristics among the members whose questions
were the last to receive an oral answer in a particular debate (the ‘treatment group’). The
second column gives the corresponding mean characteristics among the questions which
were the first ones listed on the Order Paper not to receive oral answers (the ‘control
group’). The final column reports the diﬀerence between these means.
Just-answered questions Just-unanswered questions Diﬀerence
Conservative Party 0.355 0.342 0.0128
(0.894)
Lib. Dem. Party 0.105 0.122 -0.0178
(-1.897)
Changed party 0.0143 0.0116 0.00270
(0.695)
Ministerial position 0.461 0.452 0.00850
(0.574)
Age 53.39 52.81 0.583⇤
(2.188)
Age squared 2929.3 2867.6 61.77⇤
(2.146)
Years service 11.46 11.11 0.349
(1.385)
Years svc. sqrd. 202.9 187.7 15.22
(1.722)
Female 0.206 0.184 0.0220⇤
(1.992)
Observations 5176
Standard errors clustered at member level
t-statistics reported in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
treatment and control groups persist under this comparison, it will therefore be possible
to conclude that it is an ex post manipulation of the speed of the debate after seeing the
Order Paper (i.e. during the debate itself) which creates an environment where certain
questions are more likely to be admitted than others.
Table 3.4 reports the results of diﬀerence-in-means tests where the ‘treatment group’
consists of the last questions answered across all debates and the ‘control group’ consists
of the first questions unanswered across all debates.
Results in Table 3.4 are based on a much smaller sample size, given that attention is
focused solely on questions marginally admitted and excluded from oral debates. As a
87
result, few of the results show statistical significance when compared with earlier findings.
It is informative, however, to compare the magnitudes of the reported diﬀerences.
Once again, Conservative Party members are found to be more likely to have their
questions just admitted to debates than have their questions just excluded. Among the
‘just-answered’ questions, 35.5% were asked by Conservative Party MPs, whereas among
the ‘just-unanswered’ questions, 34.2% were asked by Conservative Party MPs. Given
the small sample size, this 1.3% diﬀerence is not found to be statistically significant. In
terms of magnitudes, however, it is not far short of the 2.4% and 1.5% diﬀerences reported
in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. This oﬀers some tentative evidence that endogeneity
associated with the speed at which debates progress works in favor of Conservative Party
MPs in oﬀering them a higher probability of having their questions answered than would
be expected under a true randomization.
Interestingly, Table 3.4 reports that the average age of members among the ‘just-
answered’ questions is 0.58 years older than among the ‘just unanswered’ questions. This
compares with a diﬀerence of 0.46 years in Table 3.1. This large eﬀect is found to be
statistically significant at the 5% level, even accounting for the much smaller sample size
using this method. The endogeneity in the speed at which debates progress is therefore
found to favor older members in allowing them a greater chance of having their questions
answered once their questions are selected for the Order Paper. Among the ‘just-answered’
questions, members also have an average number of years’ service that is 0.35 years higher
than among the ‘just-unanswered’ questions. This compares with a diﬀerence of 0.6 years
in Table 3.1, but is not found to be statistically significant in this case, again owing to the
small sample size.
Finally, Table 3.4 shows that female members are more likely to have their questions
‘just-answered’ than ‘just-unanswered’. 20.6% of the ‘just-answered’ questions were asked
by female members, whereas only 18.4% of the ‘just-unanswered’ questions were asked by
female members. The 2.2 percentage point diﬀerence between these two populations is
found to be statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests an endogeneity in the
debating process which gives preferential treatment to female members when admitting
marginal questions into debates.
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Given that the members posing questions are limited in their involvement in debates,
the two most likely causes of these diﬀerences are the ministers facing the questions in
debates, and the Speaker. The ministers may have an incentive to give longer answers to
early questions, for example, in the event that they see potentially hostile questions from
opposition party members further down the Order Paper. The Speaker’s role is to correct
such behavior and they may also have a further influence on which questions are answered
by deciding how many follow-up questions to allow for each question listed on the Order
Paper.
If ministers played the dominant role in influencing which questions receive an oral
answer, it would surely be expected that a lower proportion of questions by opposition
party members would receive oral answers. The fact that a higher proportion of questions
asked by opposition party members are admitted into debates than are excluded suggests
that the Speaker plays a more prominent role in this process than the ministers. While this
could be interpreted as a bias against the Labour Party (which governed throughout the
period covered by this dataset) it could also be interpreted as the Speaker counteracting the
type of tactics which would otherwise be employed by ministers to manipulate the pattern
of debates so as to face a lower proportion of hostile questions than would otherwise be
the case.
3.4 Breakdowns Over Time
The above analysis shows that there exist diﬀerences between the observable characteristics
of members who have their questions answered in the House of Commons and those whose
questions instead receive written answers. The fact that many of these diﬀerences are
also seen when comparing only those questions that are marginally included or excluded
from debates, coupled with the nature of the diﬀerences (accepting more questions from
opposition party members), suggests that the Speaker’s role in determining the speed at
which debates progress is at least partly responsible for these diﬀerences.
Over the time period in question, three members served as Speakers in the House
of Commons. From 27 April 1992 to 23 October 2000 a former Labour Party member
(Baroness Boothroyd) served as Speaker. Another former Labour Party member held the
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post from 23 October 2000 to 22 June 2009 (Baron Martin of Springburn). Finally, a
former Conservative Party member (Rt. Hon. John Bercow MP) served as Speaker from
22 June 2009 to the time of writing this chapter. Given that the Labour Party was in
government across the entire period covered by this dataset, this means that in debates
taking place before 22 June 2009 the Speaker was a former member of the governing
party. For all debates taking place after this date the Speaker was a former member of
the opposition party.
This section considers each of the time periods in turn to determine whether the dif-
ferences between the observed characteristics of the members who posed answered and
unanswered questions are particularly prevalent in any of those time periods. Table 3.5
reports only the diﬀerences between the average values of the characteristics of members
asking answered and unanswered questions. This is purely for ease of comparison and
the averages across the two groups in each case are available on request. The final col-
umn in Table 3.5 repeats the results of diﬀerence-in-means tests using the entire dataset
(previously reported in Table 3.1), again for ease of comparison.
Results in Table 3.5 show that during the period served by the first of the three Speak-
ers (1997-2000), more questions posed by Liberal Democrat MPs were admitted during
debates than would be expected if questions were chosen purely at random. This finding
is close in magnitude to the one found in the dataset as a whole but is not found to be
statistically significant at the 5% level, given that it is based on a smaller sample size. By
contrast in the dataset as a whole it was found that more questions from Conservative
Party MPs were answered during debates than should be expected, but this is not found
to be the case during this period.
In fact across all the observed characteristics during this first period, there are no
statistically significant diﬀerences between the members whose questions were answered
and those that remained unanswered. The absence of statistically significant diﬀerences
between the treatment and control groups cannot be simply attributed to the smaller
sample size that results from considering a smaller time period. In fact the observed
diﬀerences are in all cases smaller in magnitude than those reported in the final column
for the dataset as a whole.
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Table 3.5: Diﬀerence-in-means tests across the three time periods covered by the Speakers
who served in the House of Commons between 1997 and 2010. Only the diﬀerences them-
selves, with associated t-statistics, are reported in this table, alongside the corresponding
diﬀerences for the dataset as a whole (previously reported in Table 3.1) for ease of com-
parison. The first column reports the diﬀerences between the mean characteristics for the
period during which the Speaker position was held by Betty Boothroyd, the second column
reports the diﬀerences for the period during which Michael Martin was the Speaker and
the third column reports the diﬀerences for the period during which John Bercow was the
Speaker.
Betty Boothroyd Michael Martin John Bercow Overall
Conservative Party -0.00463 0.0209⇤⇤ 0.0442 0.0243⇤⇤
(-0.567) (2.942) (1.893) (3.144)
Lib. Dem. Party 0.00906 0.00723 -0.00471 0.0113⇤⇤
(1.764) (1.957) (-0.319) (3.034)
Changed party 0.000958 0.00183 0.00814 0.00309
(0.725) (1.156) (1.266) (1.549)
Ministerial position 0.0125 0.0285⇤⇤⇤ -0.00575 0.0364⇤⇤⇤
(1.426) (4.010) (-0.246) (4.849)
Age -0.0505 0.277⇤ 0.640 0.461⇤⇤⇤
(-0.289) (2.172) (1.485) (3.333)
Age squared -4.542 29.40⇤ 69.54 49.87⇤⇤⇤
(-0.235) (2.164) (1.560) (3.335)
Years service -0.00748 0.429⇤⇤ 0.642 0.601⇤⇤⇤
(-0.0430) (3.287) (1.589) (4.107)
Years svc. sqrd. 4.447 11.51⇤ 24.92 17.00⇤⇤
(0.691) (2.334) (1.811) (3.079)
Female -0.0000964 0.00486 -0.0114 0.00189
(-0.0162) (0.896) (-0.734) (0.355)
Observations 16204 35227 3024 54455
Betty Boothroyd served as Speaker between 27 April 1992 and 23 October 2000
Michael Martin served as Speaker between 23 October 2000 and 22 June 2009
John Bercow served as Speaker from 22 June 2009 to the time of writing this paper
Standard errors clustered at member level
t-statistics reported in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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The second column reports the results of the second time period under consideration
(2000-2009). The diﬀerences found between the two groups of questions across the dataset
as a whole are largely replicated when attention is focused on this time period alone. Con-
servative Party members are found to have a higher probability of having their questions
answered than would be the case if the questions to be answered were truly chosen at
random. This diﬀerence is found to be statistically significant at the 1% level, with a t-
statistic of 2.94. This result comes in spite of the fact that the Speaker during this period
was a former member of the Labour Party.
Similarly, members who at some point held a ministerial position are found to be more
likely to have their questions answered, as are older members and those who had served
for longer as an MP at the time the question was asked. Each of these eﬀects is also found
to be statistically significant at the 5% level, despite the smaller sample size.
The third column reports results from the third and final time period under consider-
ation (2009-2010). Once again, Conservative MPs are found to have a higher probability
of having their questions answered during parliamentary debates than would be expected
under a truly random selection of questions. The size of the diﬀerence is found to be more
than twice as large as the eﬀect reported in Column 2 for the time period between 2000
and 2009. The t-statistic associated with this eﬀect reflects the fact that this finding is
based on a much smaller time period and therefore sample size than the result in Column
2 and is therefore not found to be statistically significant at the 5% level.
This result is potentially important, however, given that despite being a former member
of the Conservative Party himself, this Speaker has been accused of bias against the
Conservative Party in enforcing parliamentary procedure. This result suggests that in
fact, during this Speaker’s term, a higher number of questions from Conservative Party
members were admitted in debates than would have been the case had the randomization
process been followed exactly.
No other statistically significant diﬀerences were found between the observed charac-
teristics of members whose questions were answered and unanswered during this third
time period. This is largely driven by the small sample size available during this period,
however, and masks some large observed coeﬃcients when compared with the other time
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periods. In this third column, for example, questions asked by members who changed party
allegiance during the parliamentary term in which the question was asked were found to
have their questions answered more often than should be expected under a randomization.
Specifically, 2.7% of the answered questions in this period were asked by members who
changed party, whereas only 1.9% of the unanswered questions were asked by members
who changed party, implying a diﬀerence of 0.81 percentage points. While this in itself
is not found to be statistically significant, with a t-statistic of 1.27, the eﬀect is large
compared with the other time periods, where the comparable diﬀerences were estimated
as 0.096 and 0.183 percentage points respectively. This could be interpreted as a prefer-
ence by this Speaker for admitting questions posed by more radical members, or those at
the fringes of their parties, who in turn would be the most likely to have switched party
aﬃliation.
Older members, as well as those who have served for longer as MPs, are found to have
their questions answered more often than would be expected under an eﬀective random-
ization in this third time period. The diﬀerences between the two groups are again found
to be larger than those reported in either of the previous time periods, but just fall short
of implying statistical significance at the 5% level, again as a result of the small sample
size.
By contrast, members of the Liberal Democrat Party were not found to have their
questions answered more often than would be expected under an eﬀective randomization
(as was the case across the other two time periods). Similarly, members who achieved
ministerial positions were not given any preferential treatment during this time period.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter has shown that there exist statistically significant diﬀerences between the
characteristics of members whose questions receive oral answers in UK parliamentary
debates and those whose questions are not reached. By comparing the characteristics of
members whose questions are marginally included or excluded from debates, it has also
been possible to show that the Speaker plays an important role in determining which
questions receive oral answers from all those that are listed on the Order Paper.
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The Speaker’s role in Parliament is demanding in that it requires the holder of the post
to ensure that parliamentary rules are respected throughout debates, in an environment
where both sides of the House may well look to gain advantages by stretching the inter-
pretation of those rules. In all debates of this kind, including the ones studied here, it
is likely that government ministers facing questions could aim to avoid diﬃcult questions
further down the Order Paper and it is the Speaker’s job to prevent this from happening.
In doing so, it may be that the Speaker over-compensates for the government’s perceived
unwillingness to answer inconvenient questions, which would present itself in the data as
a greater proportion of opposition party questions among the answered questions than
those which remain unanswered. This was precisely what was found when looking over
the course of the time-period studied here.
As well as the finding that opposition party members were more likely to have their
questions answered orally, it was consistently shown to be the case that older members
and those who had served for a longer period in the House of Commons were more likely
to have their questions answered, even when restricting attention to marginal questions
which were either ‘just-answered’ or ‘just-unanswered’. One possible explanation would
be that such MPs hold a higher level of authority and are therefore able to exert more
pressure on the Speaker to ensure that their questions are admitted to debates. This
undermines the randomization process which determines the ordering of parliamentary
questions and is designed precisely to ensure that all MPs have an equal chance of having
their question answered, regardless of their level of seniority or any other characteristics.
The breakdowns over time show that the large majority of the diﬀerences in the treat-
ment of questions from members with particular characteristics took place under the tenure
of the two most recent Speakers to serve in the House of Commons. Michael Martin was
the Speaker for a large part of the period covered by the dataset (2000-2009), and during
his tenure, statistically significant diﬀerences can be observed between the characteristics
of members whose questions were answered and unanswered. During the later period cov-
ered by John Bercow, some of the observed diﬀerences are in fact of a larger magnitude,
but are not found to be statistically significant, given that they are based on a smaller
sample size.
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An important caveat to these findings is that the Speakers themselves do not chair all
the debates during their tenure. In some cases where the Speaker is unable to attend
or where parliamentary protocol determines, the Deputy Speaker will chair debates. The
Deputy Speaker is typically taken from the opposite party to the one previously served
by the Speaker themself. From the data available, it is not possible to determine whether
the Speaker themself or one of their deputies chaired debates.
The findings reported in this chapter have implications for other studies which attempt
to exploit natural experiments in parliamentary procedure. Loewen et al. (2013) and
Chapter 2 in this thesis use such parliamentary procedures to infer whether the behavior
of legislators in Parliament influences their chances of reelection. The results reported
here show that in systems where a priority list is randomly-ordered, adequate care must be
taken to ensure that the allocation to the treatment and control groups is truly exogenous.
Chapter 2 does this by dropping questions which are deemed most likely to have been either
admitted or omitted from the treatment group in a non-random way.
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Chapter 4
The House of Representatives to the
Senate: US Congress Elections and
their Eﬀect on the Economic Outcomes
of Constituents
4.1 Introduction
An important question which has received relatively little attention in the social sciences
literature is whether legislators’ political backgrounds influence their choices and outcomes
during their time in oﬃce. This study attempts to investigate this issue by focusing
attention on a particular group of politicians whose political backgrounds can be observed
and compared. The group in question are members of the US Congress who sought election
to the Senate, having previously served in the House of Representatives.
In the US political system, Congress is formed of two chambers, each filled by elected
members from a given region of the USA. Each member of the lower house (the House
of Representatives) is elected by, and therefore representative of, a congressional district
within a US state. The total number of representatives is currently fixed at 435, with
some states being made up of only one congressional district, and others being comprised
of more than fifty. Conversely, the upper house (the Senate) contains two members elected
from each state, so the total number of senators is fixed at 100.
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Many members of the House of Representatives subsequently seek election to the Senate
(Ostermeier (2011)). This transition from the lower to the upper house is often viewed
as a ‘promotion’ and will frequently be referred to as such in this chapter. By focusing
attention on these cases, this chapter will compare the incomes of the constituents in the
congressional districts represented by these legislators under diﬀerent electoral outcomes.
For example, it will be possible to determine whether representatives who seek election to
the upper house tend to have served states with higher incomes than other constituents
whose representatives do not seek election to the upper house. Previous studies have also
specifically considered the eﬀects of transition between the House and the Senate. Grofman
et al. (1995) in particular compares the voting behavior of senators who previously served
in the House of Representatives with various control groups. This chapter is the first,
however, to compare the economic outcomes of the constituents who reside in districts
previously served by legislators who move between legislative chambers in this way.
The question as to what type of candidate is put forward for election is particularly
important if it is believed that the characteristics and experiences of legislators will aﬀect
their decision-making when in oﬃce and there is a large literature which aims to determine
whether this is the case. It has been argued, for example, that electing females to oﬃce
improves gender equality. This ‘politics of presence’ literature (Phillips (1995)) argues
that female legislators pay greater regard to the rights of females in the constituencies
they serve. There could also exist another path of influence by aﬀecting the aspirations
of female citizens by demonstrating the possibility of achieving high oﬃce. As well as
personal characteristics, it is possible that political backgrounds may influence legislator
decision-making and this chapter will contribute to this body of research in particular.
This chapter is also relevant to the literature studying the link between election results
and the economic outcomes of constituents. Dolan et al. (2008) find for example that
the outcomes of recent UK elections had no discernible eﬀect on the well-being of British
citizens. Conversely, many authors (Ray (1980); Stein and Bickers (1994); Clark and
Milcent (2011)) have looked for evidence of a link between ‘pork barrel’ eﬀects and electoral
success.
There is also a substantial literature which considers whether diﬀerent income levels
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are adequately represented in the US political system. Bartels (2008) finds that senators
take account of public opinion among high-income constituents more so than the opinion
among low-income constituents. Rigby and Wright (2013) find that low-income citizens
have little influence on the campaign appeals of US political parties, given that they oﬀer
lower potential resources to the parties. There also exists a more general debate regarding
the relative levels of political influence of diﬀerent US citizens. Given that each state has
two representatives in the Senate, for example, Levinson (2006) argues that the democratic
system oﬀers a disproportionate influence to citizens of smaller states.
This chapter compares the incomes of constituents from districts where the representa-
tive subsequently sought election to the upper house. Section 4.2 reviews the data which
was used to conduct the analysis and Section 4.3 sets out the method by which the analysis
will be carried out. Section 4.4 reports the results of regressions comparing constituents
whose representatives sought election to the upper house (successfully or otherwise) with
those from other districts in the same state in the same year. Section 4.5 then restricts
attention to those citizens from districts where the representatives sought election to the
upper house and compares average incomes between those citizens whose representatives
were successful in being elected to the upper house and those whose representatives were
unsuccessful in doing so. Section 4.6 oﬀers some conclusions from the findings.
4.2 Data
The study uses a combination of data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS) dataset and data collected from historical accounts of US Senate elections. The
BRFSS dataset is a telephone survey conducted across the USA each year since 1984. A
number of checks have been carried out on the validity of these survey responses (Nelson
et al. (2003)), finding generally positive results. The data has been used as the basis for
a wide number of health studies, including recent studies of well-being (Oswald and Wu
(2010)).
Since 1988, this study also collected data on respondents’ counties of residence, which
can then be linked to congressional districts. To complete the process of matching counties
to congressional districts, the ‘Missouri Census Data Center’ was used, which allows the
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analysis to take into account changes to the boundaries of congressional districts over the
time period considered in the study. While these do not in all cases provide a one-to-one
match for districts, it is possible to match such counties with all districts which have any
overlap, to generate a set of possible districts for each respondent. In most cases, the
number of possible districts is small, with 51% of the full dataset under consideration
able to be matched to a single district, and a further 20% able to be matched to one of
two districts. There are a small number of cases, however, where respondents reside in a
county that can be associated with many districts, the highest number being eighteen. As
part of these surveys, respondents were asked to give details regarding their gender, age,
height, weight, education levels, employment status, marital status and racial background,
as well as a series of health questions. While respondents in the BRFSS survey were not
asked to report their individual incomes, they were asked to place their household income
into one of the following categories:
• Category 1: $0 to $10000
• Category 2: $10000 to $15000
• Category 3: $15000 to $20000
• Category 4: $20000 to $25000
• Category 5: $25000 to $35000
• Category 6: $35000 to $50000
• Category 7: $50000 to $75000
• Category 8: Over $75000 (only available from 1994 onwards)
The highest of these categories was not oﬀered as a possible response in the years up to
1993, so all regressions will be based on data from 1994 onwards, with previous years
discarded. To create a dependent variable from these responses, each respondent’s income
level is taken to be the mid-range of these response groups, with incomes of $100000
allocated arbitrarily to the top income group. The dependent variable is then taken to be
the natural logarithm of these income levels.
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Coupled with this dataset, records of all Senate elections covering this period are freely
available on-line, so for the purposes of this study, it was also possible to go through such
records to form a new dataset recording not only those lower-house representatives who
were successfully elected to the upper house, but also those representatives who launched
unsuccessful bids to be elected to the upper house. The availability of data on these
unsuccessful candidates will be crucial in the identification strategy of the models that
follow. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 in the Appendix list all of the members of Congress who sought
election to the upper house between the years 1994 and 2012, having previously served
in the lower house. Table 4.3 lists those members who were successfully elected to the
upper house during that time period, whereas Table 4.4 lists those who were unsuccessful
in their election bids. In total, 56 lower house representatives were elected to the upper
house between 1994 and 2012. Conversely, 57 legislators who served in the lower house
made unsuccessful election bids to the upper house during the period between 1994 and
2012.
4.3 Method
All of the following results will be based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.
Let i = 1, . . . , I represent the set of respondents to the BRFSS survey over the years
t = 1994, . . . 2012. Let yti represent the income of player i, who was surveyed as part of
the BRFSS in year t. For each player, this refers to the mid-point of the income range to
which they assigned themself in their BRFSS survey responses. The dependent variable
in each of the regressions that follows will be the natural logarithm of this income.
Lower house representatives are elected to serve a district, whereas upper house legis-
lators are elected to serve a state, which is divided into a certain number of districts. In
terms of notation, let sti represent the state in which player i resides in year t and let dti
represent the district in which player i resides in year t.
The only thing that will change in the regressions that follow is the definition of the
explanatory variable of interest. Each of the regressions will compare the average incomes
of BRFSS survey respondents whose representatives sought promotion to the upper house
with some control group of BRFSS survey respondents who are deemed comparable. Let-
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ting Zti represent a set of control variables relating to the individual characteristics of
player i as recorded in year t, it is possible to estimate the following regression by OLS:
ln
 
yti
 
= ↵0 + ↵1x
t
i + ↵2Z
t
i + ✏i
4.4 Comparing Districts Where Representatives Sought Promo-
tion
The first part of the study aims to determine whether legislators in the lower house who
seek election to the upper house tend to represent districts with higher average incomes.
In this comparison, no distinction is made between the legislators who successfully achieve
election to the upper house and those who are unsuccessful in doing so. The control group
used here will be those citizens who resided in the same state as a representative who
sought promotion in the same year, but who lived in a district other than the one served
by the representative.
Extending the notation from Section 4.3, let St denote the set of all 50 states in year t
and s?t 2 St denote the set of states within that set where a representative sought election
to the upper house in the year t. Similarly, Dt denotes the set of all congressional districts
in year t and d?t 2 Dt denotes the set of districts within that set where the representative
sought election to the upper house in the year t.
With these definitions in hand, let El (sti, dti) ! ({0, 1} , {0, 1}) be a function which
maps the state and district of player i in year t on to two separate binary variables, which
each indicate whether a representative of that state or that district sought promotion to
the upper house in the year t. Specifically, you have:
El
 
sti, d
t
i
 
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(1, 1) if sti 2 s?t and dti 2 d?t
(1, 0) if sti 2 s?t and dti /2 d?t
(0, 0) if sti /2 s?t and dti /2 d?t
Or more succinctly, El (sti, dti) = (1s?t (sti) ,1d?t (dti)). In this case the explanatory vari-
able of interest can be written as:
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xti =
8>><>>:
1 if El (sti, dti) = (1, 1)
0 if El (sti, dti) = (1, 0)
This regression takes no account of respondents residing in states where no lower house
representative sought election to the upper house. Alternatively, the regression above can
be rewritten as:
ln
 
yti
 
= ↵0 + ↵1El
 
dti
 
+ ↵2Z
t
i + ✏i, for all i such that El
 
sti
 
= 1
In all the results that follow, each coeﬃcient is interpreted as representing the per-
centage increase in average incomes that is associated with a one unit increase in the
explanatory variable. The consistent use of this approximation makes comparison of co-
eﬃcients straightforward. It is also accurate, given that all the coeﬃcients of interest
reported in this chapter are below 0.05.
Table 4.1 shows that constituents from districts where the representative sought election
to the upper house in the same year are found to have incomes that are approximately
4.75 percent higher than respondents from the same states, but whose representatives did
not seek election to the upper house, without including any further controls. This eﬀect is
found to be statistically significant at the 5% level. When including dummy variables to
control for the fixed eﬀects associated with the year and state in which the respondent was
surveyed, constituents in districts where the representatives sought election to the upper
house are found to have incomes that are on average around 4.2 percent higher than
constituents from other districts in the state. This eﬀect is again found to be statistically
significant at the 5% level.
By including variables to control for respondent characteristics in Columns 3 and 4 of
Table 4.1, the eﬀect is reduced slightly, so that constituents from congressional districts
where the lower house representative sought election to the upper house are found to
have 2.8 percent higher incomes than constituents residing in the same state but diﬀerent
congressional districts. This eﬀect remains statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level.
With regard to the control variables, older respondents are found to have higher incomes,
with the eﬀect decreasing as their age increases. Female and hispanic respondents are found
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Table 4.1: Table of regressions comparing constituent incomes in districts where the repre-
sentative sought election to the upper house compared with other residents of the same
state in the same year, but who came from diﬀerent districts. The dependent variable is
the natural logarithm of the mid-point of the income bracket of each respondent (mean =
10.52 and standard deviation = 0.82 for the entire sample, where N = 404, 394).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income (log) Income (log) Income (log) Income (log)
Rep. sought promotion to Senate 0.0475⇤ 0.0421⇤ 0.0407⇤ 0.0277⇤
(2.05) (2.13) (2.21) (2.24)
Respondent age 0.0455⇤⇤⇤ 0.0189⇤⇤⇤
(21.18) (12.51)
Respondent age sqd -0.000500⇤⇤⇤ -0.000233⇤⇤⇤
(-20.94) (-14.44)
Female respondent -0.184⇤⇤⇤ -0.115⇤⇤⇤
(-38.96) (-32.39)
Hispanic respondent -0.428⇤⇤⇤ -0.197⇤⇤⇤
(-17.65) (-12.41)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes
State dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Education dummies No No No Yes
Marital status dummies No No No Yes
Race dummies No No No Yes
Observations 404394 404394 401168 390641
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.038 0.123 0.404
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at state-year level
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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to have lower incomes on average than male and non-hispanic respondents respectively.
Overall, these results imply that in the year where a representative in the lower house
of the US Congress seeks election to the upper house, constituents in the district which
those legislators represent have higher incomes on average than constituents from other
congressional districts within the same state.
4.4.1 Lagged Regressions
These reported diﬀerences could come about as a result of representatives seeking pro-
motion having represented a particular type of district. Conversely, the diﬀerences could
be related to the representative themself. For example, representatives seeking promotion
may be able to artificially increase incomes in their districts to help their promotion bid,
or simply wait for an opportune moment when incomes are high to seek promotion.
To oﬀer some insights into which of these eﬀects is taking place, it will be informative to
consider whether the districts from which legislators sought promotion to the upper house
had higher incomes than other districts within the same state over a prolonged period,
or whether the diﬀerence is only observed temporarily. Further regressions are therefore
estimated, which follow exactly the same procedure, but which match constituents to
legislators with varying time lags.
For example, it will be interesting to calculate whether incomes were higher on average
among the districts where the representative sought election to the upper house one year
before they did so. This will involve finding all the respondents to the BRFSS survey who
resided in a state whereby in the following year (t + 1) a representative from that state
sought election to the upper house having previously served in the lower house. Within
this group, it will be possible to compare the average incomes of the respondents who
resided in the district previously served by the lower house representative with those from
other districts in the same state. In this case the explanatory variable of interest can be
written as:
xt+1i =
8>><>>:
1 if El
 
st+1i , d
t+1
i
 
= (1, 1)
0 if El
 
st+1i , d
t+1
i
 
= (1, 0)
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To generalize the above example, introduce the variable lag, which reports the number
of years between the year in which the survey was conducted and the year in which the
representative sought promotion to the upper house. In the case above, you have lag =  1
because a comparison is being made between respondents one year before the elections
took place.
By introducing this lag variable, the following regression can be estimated:
ln
 
yti
 
= ↵0 + ↵1El
⇣
dt lagi
⌘
+ ↵2Z
t
i + ✏
t
i, for all i such that El
⇣
st lagi
⌘
= 1
To compare outcomes over time, the above regression will be estimated using a number
of diﬀerent lags, from lag =  5 to lag = +5. The results are reported in detail in Table
4.5 in the Appendix. These results are based on regressions which include all the control
variables used in Table 4.1. The result for lag = 0 in Table 4.5 therefore corresponds
to the results reported in Column 4 of Table 4.1. To give an idea of how the coeﬃcient
changes over diﬀerent lag values, Figure 4.1 plots the coeﬃcient of interest along with 95%
confidence intervals for lag values ranging from -5 to +5.
Figure 4.1 shows that incomes among the districts where representatives sought pro-
motion to the upper house were consistently higher than incomes in other districts in the
same states. This is found to be the case both before and after the elections to the upper
house took place. Survey respondents in districts where the representative sought election
to the upper house five years after the constituent was surveyed (the leftmost data point)
are found to have incomes approximately 4.5 percent higher than respondents from other
districts in the same state. Similarly, respondents living in districts where the constituent
was surveyed five years after the representative sought election to the upper house are
found to have incomes that are around 4.4 percent higher than respondents from other
districts in the same state (the rightmost data point).
Although all coeﬃcients are positive, the diﬀerences between the average incomes of the
survey respondents from districts where the representative sought election to the upper
house and other respondents from other districts in the same state are reduced when
comparing respondents who answered the BRFSS survey around the same time as their
representatives sought election to the upper house (i.e. when lag takes the values -1, 0, or
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Figure 4.1: Each of the points in the graph shows the result of a regression estimating the
diﬀerence in incomes between residents of districts where the lower house representative
sought election to the upper house and residents of diﬀerent congressional districts in
the same state. The 95% confidence intervals around these estimated coeﬃcients are
also shown. The horizontal axis plots the lag variable. Each point therefore shows the
diﬀerence between the average incomes of the two groups at some interval before or after
the representative sought election to the upper house. For example, the point at lag =  5
shows the coeﬃcient described above 5 years before the representative sought promotion.
The graph below therefore illustrates how the coeﬃcient of interest evolves over time either
side of the period where the representative sought election to the upper house (i.e. when
lag = 0).
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1). For lag values of -1 and 1, the diﬀerence between the average incomes of respondents
from districts where the representative sought election to the upper house and respondents
from other districts in the same state is not found to be significantly diﬀerent from zero
at the 5% level.
Figure 4.1 is interpreted as showing that lower house representatives who seek election
to the upper house in the US Congress come from districts where incomes are permanently
higher on average than respondents from other districts in the same states. This figure
serves to counter the hypothesis that incomes are higher among the constituents in districts
where representatives seek election to the upper house because representatives choose an
opportune moment to seek promotion to the upper house. If this hypothesis were true,
it would be expected that incomes among survey respondents from the districts where
the representative sought promotion would increase relative to the incomes of respondents
from other districts in the years leading up to the point where the representative sought
promotion. The pattern seen in Figure 4.1 shows no evidence of this, however, with the
diﬀerences particularly large and significant in the years before the representative sought
election to the upper house. If anything, the diﬀerence is reduced when comparing survey
respondents in the years immediately before and after the representative sought election
to the upper house.
This pattern, alongside the fact that in the years after the representative sought election
to the upper house the diﬀerence between the incomes of the two groups is restored to its
original level of around 4 percent, suggests that the diﬀerence between the incomes is a
more permanent one. In particular, this implies that representatives who seek election to
the upper house (without necessarily being successful) tend to have previously represented
congressional districts where incomes are permanently higher than those of other districts
in the same state.
4.5 Comparing Successful and Failed Election Bids
Whereas Section 4.4 considered the relationship between constituent incomes and rep-
resentatives who seek election to the upper house, this section attempts to capture the
relationship between constituent incomes and representatives who win those elections.
108
This section again uses ordinary least squares estimation, whereby incomes are con-
trasted between those survey respondents whose representatives were successful in achiev-
ing promotion to the upper house and a control group whose representatives sought election
to the upper house but were unsuccessful in doing so. This method eﬀectively restricts
attention to the treatment group from Section 4.4, i.e. survey respondents from districts
where the lower-house representative sought election to the upper house.
Let Win (dti) = 1 if respondent i resides in a district where the lower house represen-
tative was successfully elected to the upper house in year t. Conversely, Win (dti) = 0 if
respondent i resides in a district where the lower house representative sought election to
the upper house in year t, but was unsuccessful in doing so. In this case the explanatory
variable of interest can be written as:
xi =
8>><>>:
1 if Win (dti) = 1
0 if Win (dti) = 0
Such an approach restricts attention to those observations relating to respondents re-
siding in congressional districts where a lower-house representative sought election to the
upper house. Survey responses from all other respondents are therefore discarded. This
substantially reduces the size of the dataset, from around 400,000 to 140,000 respondents
(the exact figure depends on which control variables are included in regressions). The
regression equation can be written as:
ln
 
yti
 
= ↵0 + ↵1Win
 
dti
 
+ ↵2Z
t
i + ✏
t
i
The first result reported in Table 4.2 compares the log-incomes of citizens from con-
gressional districts where the representative was successfully elected to the upper house in
the year in which they responded to the BRFSS survey and other constituents who reside
in congressional districts where the representative unsuccessfully sought election to the
upper house in the year in which they were surveyed, with no additional controls. This
result suggests that respondents whose representatives are successfully promoted to the
upper house in the same year have incomes that are 1.45 percent higher than respondents
whose representatives are unsuccessful in seeking election to the upper house. This eﬀect
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Table 4.2: Table of regressions comparing average incomes in districts where the representa-
tive was successfully elected to the upper house in the same year against average incomes
in districts where the representative unsuccessfully sought election to the upper house in
the same year. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the mid-point of the
income bracket of each respondent (mean = 10.55 and standard deviation = 0.81 for the
entire sample, where N = 144, 817 ).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income (log) Income (log) Income (log) Income (log)
Rep. elected to Senate 0.0145 0.0262 0.0257 0.0261⇤
(0.35) (1.68) (1.76) (2.24)
Respondent age 0.0493⇤⇤⇤ 0.0207⇤⇤⇤
(34.18) (17.03)
Respondent age sqd -0.000537⇤⇤⇤ -0.000253⇤⇤⇤
(-37.35) (-21.19)
Female respondent -0.163⇤⇤⇤ -0.108⇤⇤⇤
(-28.36) (-23.50)
Hispanic respondent -0.426⇤⇤⇤ -0.186⇤⇤⇤
(-16.49) (-11.64)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes
State dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Education dummies No No No Yes
Marital status dummies No No No Yes
Race dummies No No No Yes
Observations 144817 144817 143675 139041
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.051 0.141 0.406
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at state-year level
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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is not found to be statistically significant, however, with a t-statistic of just 0.35. Column
2 introduces dummy variables to control for fixed eﬀects associated with the year and state
in which the respondent was surveyed. The coeﬃcient of interest increases so that citizens
of districts where the representatives are successfully promoted to the upper house have
incomes that are 2.6 percent higher than citizens of districts where the representative was
unsuccessful in their bid to be elected to the upper house. The t-statistic remains below
the threshold required to indicate statistical significance at the 5% level.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4.2 report the results of further regressions, each including
controls for the characteristics of the survey respondents (the constituents). The coeﬃ-
cient of interest remains largely unchanged by the inclusion of these additional controls,
indicating that citizens of congressional districts where the representative was successfully
promoted to the upper house in the same year have incomes that are 2.6 percent higher
than those from districts where the representative unsuccessfully sought election to the
upper house in the same year. The added precision that is achieved by including all these
additional controls in Column 4 means that in this case the diﬀerence is found to be
statistically significant at the 5% level.
With regard to the control variables, older respondents are again found to have higher
incomes, with the eﬀect decreasing as their age increases. Female and hispanic respondents
are again found to have lower incomes on average than male and non-hispanic respondents
respectively.
These results suggest that legislators who are successful in their attempts to gain promo-
tion from the lower to the upper house served congressional districts with higher incomes
on average than the districts served by similar legislators who unsuccessfully tried to gain
promotion to the upper house. Based on these results alone, however, it is not possible
to oﬀer any insight as to whether that eﬀect comes about from a preference among voters
for representatives from already-wealthy districts (for example if the wealth of the district
was positively correlated with campaign spending), or whether this could be interpreted as
voters rewarding representatives who served congressional districts where average incomes
were seen to have increased under their tenure. The following analysis will follow a similar
pattern to that in Section 4.4 by comparing survey respondents at diﬀerent times before
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and after their representatives sought election to the upper house.
4.5.1 Lagged Regressions
To shed some light on the reason behind the diﬀerences in incomes between the districts
where representatives are successful in being promoted to the upper house and those that
seek promotion unsuccessfully, it is useful to consider to what extent these diﬀerences
persist over time. To achieve this, similar regressions will be run as were reported in
Section 4.4, where survey responses are taken at diﬀerent time periods before and after
a representative sought election to the upper house. All the possible control variables
for respondent characteristics are included in these regressions (as in Column 4 of Table
4.2) and the estimation will again be carried out under time-lags ranging from -5 to +5.
The detailed results of such regressions (including coeﬃcients associated with the control
variables) are left to the Appendix (Table 4.6). Instead, Figure 4.2 shows a graph of the
coeﬃcients of interest over time, as well as the 95% confidence intervals associated with
these estimated coeﬃcients.
The leftmost datapoint in Figure 4.2 reports the diﬀerence between the log-incomes of
BRFSS respondents from districts where five years later the representative was success-
fully elected to the upper house and the log-incomes of respondents whose representatives
unsuccessfully attempted to gain election to the upper house five years after they answered
the BRFSS survey. This datapoint shows that incomes were found to be higher among
those respondents whose representatives were successful in gaining election to the upper
house five years later and significantly so.
Moving to the right in Figure 4.2, comparing respondents four years before their repre-
sentatives sought election to the upper house, the diﬀerence is substantially reduced and
is no longer statistically significant. From this point, the coeﬃcient then increases slightly
when comparing respondents three years and then two years before their representatives
sought election to the upper house. In neither case is the diﬀerence found to be significantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. Moving rightwards again, however, when comparing
respondents one year before their representatives sought election to the upper house, the
coeﬃcient increases quite dramatically and is now found to be statistically significant at
the 5% level. This implies that when comparing survey respondents whose representatives
112
Figure 4.2: Each of the points in the graph shows the result of a regression estimating
the diﬀerence in incomes between residents of districts where the lower house political
representative was successfully elected to the upper house and those where the lower-house
representative unsuccessfully sought promotion to the upper house. The 95% confidence
intervals around these estimated coeﬃcients are also shown. The horizontal axis plots the
lag variable. Each point therefore shows the diﬀerence between the average incomes of the
two groups at some interval before or after the representative sought election to the upper
house. For example, the point at lag =  5 shows the coeﬃcient described above 5 years
before the representative sought promotion. The graph below therefore illustrates how the
coeﬃcient of interest evolves over time either side of the period where the representative
sought election to the upper house (i.e. when lag = 0).
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sought election to the upper house in the following year, those respondents whose repre-
sentatives were successful are found to have incomes that are around 4.4 percent higher on
average than respondents whose representatives unsuccessfully attempted to gain election
to the upper house the year after the citizens responded to the BRFSS survey.
Continuing to the right in Figure 4.2, coeﬃcients are found to remain positive and
statistically significant when comparing respondents whose representatives sought election
to the upper house in the same year (as shown previously in Table 4.2). Furthermore, for
citizens who were surveyed one year and two years after their representative sought election
to the upper house, incomes were again found to be higher among those respondents whose
representatives were successful in being elected to the upper house, with the diﬀerence
being statistically significant at the 5% level. Next however, comparing citizens who
responded to the BRFSS survey three years after their representative sought election to
the upper house (lag = +3), the coeﬃcient of interest is lower and no longer statistically
significant at the 5% level. This implies that while incomes are still found to be higher
among the survey respondents from the districts where the representatives were successful
in being elected to the upper house when comparisons are made three years after the
representative sought election to the upper house, the diﬀerence is reduced. This is again
found to be the case when comparing respondents four years after their representative
sought election to the upper house. Finally, when comparing respondents five years after
their representatives sought election to the upper house (the rightmost data point) the
diﬀerence is found to be very slightly negative, which implies that when comparing the
incomes of citizens five years after their representatives sought election to the upper house,
the citizens from districts where the representative was successful in the election and
therefore promoted to the upper house no longer have higher incomes on average than
those citizens from districts where the representative unsuccessfully sought election to the
upper house.
Overall, the pattern of eﬀects observed in Figure 4.2 suggests that in districts where the
representative would later go on to be elected to the upper house, average incomes increase
as you compare respondents closer and closer to the year in which their representatives seek
election to the upper house, relative to incomes in districts where the representatives go on
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to unsuccessfully seek election to the upper house. This eﬀect means that at the time where
the representatives seek election to the upper house, incomes are higher in the districts
served by representatives that go on to win their elections and move to the upper house.
Incomes then remain higher among the districts where the representatives were successfully
elected to the upper house in the years immediately following the election. From the third
year after the elections, however, the diﬀerence between the average incomes among the
districts where the representatives were successfully elected to the upper house and the
districts where the representatives were unsuccessful in their attempts to be elected to the
upper house begins to diminish. Eventually, when you compare respondents five years after
their representatives sought election to the upper house, the eﬀect completely disappears,
with average incomes almost identical between those districts where the representatives
were successfully elected to the upper house and those where their election bids were
unsuccessful.
This pattern suggests that voters in Senate elections reward representatives who served
congressional districts where incomes were seen to increase relative to other districts in
the years immediately preceding elections. In particular, the fact that incomes are not
found to be significantly diﬀerent between the two groups in the years before elections,
coupled with the fact that the statistically significant diﬀerences between the two groups
disappear when comparing survey respondents in the years following elections, points to
a temporary increase in incomes in the years surrounding the one in which the election
takes place among the districts where representatives are successfully elected to the upper
house. This pattern goes against the suggestion that representatives that go on to achieve
election to the upper house come from congressional districts with permanently higher
incomes than those representatives who unsuccessfully seek election to the upper house.
4.6 Conclusion
Many members of the House of Representatives subsequently seek election to the Senate.
In the 112th Congress which ran from 2011 to 2013, for example, 49 of the 100 Senators
had previously served in the House of Representatives (Ostermeier (2011)). This chapter
restricted attention to cases where members of the lower house sought election to the
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upper house in the US Congress and compared the incomes of constituents in the districts
previously served by those representatives under various election outcomes.
Results in Section 4.4 show that representatives who seek election to the upper house
having served as lower house representatives tend to have previously served lower house
districts with permanently higher incomes on average. Within this group of representatives
who seek election to the upper house having served in the lower house, it is found in
Section 4.5 that those representatives who are successful in their election bids tend to
come from districts where incomes are higher on average than in those districts served by
representatives who unsuccessfully sought election to the upper house. Interestingly, in
this case, the diﬀerence in incomes between the two groups is not so clearly observed in
the years before and after the representatives sought election to the upper house. This
points to a temporary increase in income, which suggests that those representatives who
are successful in achieving election to the upper house seek election at a time when the
incomes in the districts in which they previously served are high. In particular, after they
have been successful in their election bid and therefore promoted to the Senate, incomes in
the congressional districts which they previously served are found to fall back to the same
level as the congressional districts in which representatives unsuccessfully sought election
to the upper house.
Overall, this shows that while voters in Senate elections tend to be oﬀered candidates
who have previously served in districts with permanently higher incomes, voters are found
to reward legislators who previously served districts in the lower house where average
incomes increased in the years leading up to their bid to be elected to the upper house.
These two key findings point to an interesting diversion between political parties and
voters in choosing their preferred candidates. In particular, while parties tend to put for-
ward candidates from high-income districts for election to the upper house, voters tend to
actually elect the candidates where incomes have risen temporarily under that represen-
tative’s tenure. Further work that considers cases beyond only those representatives who
subsequently seek election to the Senate would be needed to properly assess the external
validity of this finding.
While it is possible to draw interesting conclusions about how voters reward legisla-
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tor performance, it is not possible to determine from this analysis whether voters are
necessarily justified in doing so. For example, the fact that incomes increase before repre-
sentatives seek election to the upper house could be reflecting the fact that incomes were
inflated artificially in the lead-up to a promotion bid. For example, large public spending
programs which have to be paid for after the legislator has been promoted to the upper
house could be politically popular, resulting in legislators winning elections. Citizens in
districts where legislators introduce such programs would see higher incomes, which could
be rewarded in elections to the upper house, before average incomes fall back after the
elections. Conversely, the observed rise in incomes before elections could be attributed
to some form of ‘political skill’, which may in turn also be correlated with the economic
outcomes (including incomes) of the citizens of the congressional district. The subsequent
absence of this legislator at the local level after they are successfully elected to the upper
house could also explain the fall in incomes after they achieve election to the upper house.
Distinguishing more precisely between these potential paths of influence could be a
useful area for future research.
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Appendix
Table 4.3: Former members of the lower house who were successfully elected
to the upper house, 1994-2012.
Year Name State Party Birth Yr. House District House Yrs. Elec. Margin
1994 Jon Kyl AZ R 1942 4 1987-1995 14.2
1994 Olympia Snowe ME R 1947 2 1979-1995 23.8
1994 Rod Grams MN R 1948 6 1993-1995 5
1994 Mike DeWine OH R 1947 7 1983-1991 14.2
1994 James Inhofe OK R 1934 1 1987-1995 15.2
1994 Rick Santorum PA R 1958 18 1991-1995 2.5
1994 Craig Thomas WY R 1933 0 1989-1995 19.6
1996 Ron Wyden OR D 1949 3 1981-1996 1.6
1996 Tim Hutchinson AR R 1949 3 1993-1997 5.4
1996 Wayne Allard CO R 1943 4 1991-1997 5.7
1996 Dick Durbin IL D 1944 20 1983-1997 15.4
1996 Pat Roberts KS R 1936 1 1981-1997 27.6
1996 Sam Brownback KS R 1956 2 1995-1997 10.6
1996 Robert Torricelli NJ D 1951 9 1983-1997 10.2
1996 Jack Reed RI D 1949 2 1991-1997 28.3
1996 Tim Johnson SD D 1946 0 1987-1997 2.6
1998 Blanche Lincoln AR D 1960 1 1993-1997 12.9
1998 Mike Crapo ID R 1951 2 1993-1999 41.1
1998 Jim Bunning KY R 1931 4 1987-1999 0.5
1998 Chuck Schumer NY D 1950 9 1993-1999 10.5
2000 Thomas R. Carper DE D 1947 0 1983-1993 11.8
2000 Bill Nelson FL D 1942 11 1983-1991 4.8
2000 Debbie Stabenow MI D 1950 8 1997-2001 1.5
2000 John Ensign NV R 1958 1 1995-1999 15.4
2000 George Allen VA R 1952 7 1991-1993 4.6
2000 Maria Cantwell WA D 1958 1 1993-1995 0.1
2002 Saxby Chambliss GA R 1943 8 1995-2003 0
2002 Jim Talent MO R 1956 2 1993-2001 1.1
2002 John E. Sununu NH R 1964 1 1997-2003 4.4
2002 Lindsey Graham SC R 1955 3 1995-2003 10.2
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2004 Johnny Isakson GA R 1944 6 1999-2005 17.9
2004 David Vitter LA R 1961 1 1999-2005 21.7
2004 Richard Burr NC R 1955 5 1995-2005 4.6
2004 Tom Coburn OK R 1948 2 1995-2001 11.6
2004 Jim DeMint SC R 1951 4 1999-2005 9.6
2004 John Thune SD R 1961 0 1997-2003 1.1
2006 Ben Cardin MD D 1943 3 1987-2007 10
2006 Bob Menendez NJ D 1954 13 1993-2006 9.1
2006 Sherrod Brown OH D 1952 13 1993-2007 12.4
2006 Bernie Sanders VT Other 1941 0 1991-2007 33.1
2008 Mark Udall CO D 1950 2 1999-2009 10.3
2008 Tom Udall NM D 1948 3 1999-2009 22.6
2010 John Boozman AR R 1950 3 2001-2011 21.1
2010 Mark Kirk IL R 1959 10 2001-2010 1.9
2010 Dan Coats IN R 1943 4 1981-1989 18.3
2010 Jerry Moran KS R 1954 1 1997-2011 44.1
2010 Roy Blunt MO R 1950 7 1997-2011 13.7
2010 Kirsten Gillibrand NY D 1966 20 2007-2009 26.2
2010 Rob Portman OH R 1955 2 1993-2005 18.3
2010 Pat Toomey PA R 1961 15 1999-2005 2
2012 Jeﬀ Flake AZ R 1962 6 2003-2013 3.1
2012 Chris Murphy CT D 1973 5 2007-2013 11.7
2012 Mazie Hirono HI D 1947 2 2007-2013 25.2
2012 Joe Donnelly IN D 1955 2 2007-2013 5.8
2012 Martin Heinrich NM D 1971 1 2009-2013 5.7
2012 Tammy Baldwin WI D 1962 2 1999-2013 5.5
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Table 4.4: Former members of the lower house who unsuccessfully sought election
to the upper house, 1994-2012.
Year Name State Party Birth Yr. House District House Yrs. Elec. Margin
1994 Sam Coppersmith AZ D 1955 1 1993-1995 -14.2
1994 Michael Huﬃngton CA R 1947 22 1993-1995 -1.9
1994 Jim Jontz IN D 1951 5 1987-1993 -36.9
1994 Thomas Andrews ME D 1953 1 1991-1995 -23.8
1994 Bill Brock MD R 1930 3 1963-1971 -18.2
1994 Bob Carr MI D 1943 8 1993-1995 -9.2
1994 Alan Wheat MO D 1951 5 1983-1995 -24.1
1994 Dave McCurdy OK D 1950 4 1981-1995 -15.2
1994 Jim Cooper TN D 1954 4 1983-1995 -21.8
1996 Jim Ross Lightfoot IA R 1938 3 1993-1997 -5.1
1996 Joseph E. Brennan ME D 1934 1 1987-1991 -5.4
1996 Dick Swett NH D 1957 2 1991-1995 -3.1
1996 Dick Zimmer NJ R 1944 12 1991-1997 -10.2
1998 Gary Franks CT R 1953 5 1991-1997 -32.7
1998 Scotty Baesler KY D 1941 6 1993-1999 -0.5
1998 John Ensign NV R 1958 1 1995-1999 -0.1
1998 Bob Inglis SC R 1959 4 1993-1999 -7
1998 Linda Smith WA R 1950 3 1995-1999 -16.8
1998 Mark Neumann WI R 1954 1 1995-1999 -2.2
2000 Tom Campbell CA R 1952 15 1995-2001 -19.2
2000 Bill McCollum FL R 1944 8 1983-2001 -4.8
2000 Bob Franks NJ R 1951 7 1993-2001 -3
2000 William T. Redmond NM R 1954 3 1997-1999 -23.4
2000 Rick Lazio NY R 1958 2 1993-2001 -12.3
2000 Ron Klink PA D 1951 4 1993-2001 -6.9
2000 Robert Weygand RI D 1948 2 1997-2001 -15.7
2002 Greg Ganske IA R 1949 4 1995-2003 -10.4
2002 John Thune SD R 1961 0 1997-2003 -0.1
2002 Bob Clement TN D 1943 5 1988-2003 -10.1
2004 Denise Majette GA D 1955 4 2003-2005 -17.9
2004 Chris John LA D 1960 7 1997-2005 -21.7
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2004 Eric Fingerhut OH D 1959 19 1993-1995 -27.8
2004 Brad Carson OK D 1967 2 2001-2005 -11.6
2004 Joe Hoeﬀel PA D 1950 13 1999-2005 -10.6
2004 George Nethercutt WA R 1944 5 1995-2005 -12.3
2006 Katherine Harris FL R 1957 13 2003-2007 -22.2
2006 Mark Kennedy MN R 1957 6 2003-2007 -20.2
2006 Harold Ford, Jr. TN D 1970 9 1997-2007 -2.7
2008 Bob Schaﬀer CO R 1962 4 1997-2003 -10.3
2008 Larry LaRocco ID D 1946 1 1991-1995 -23.6
2008 Jim Slattery KS D 1948 2 1983-1995 -23.6
2008 Tom Allen ME D 1945 1 1997-2009 -22.7
2008 Dick Zimmer NJ R 1944 12 1991-1997 -14
2008 Steve Pearce NM R 1947 2 2003-2009 -22.6
2010 Kendrick Meek FL D 1966 17 2003-2011 -28.8
2010 Brad Ellsworth IN D 1958 8 2007-2011 -18.3
2010 Charles Melancon LA D 1947 3 2005-2011 -18.9
2010 Paul Hodes NH D 1951 2 2007-2011 -23.5
2010 Joseph DioGuardi NY R 1940 20 1985-1989 -26.2
2010 Joe Sestak PA D 1951 7 2007-2011 -2
2012 Connie Mack I FL R 1967 14 2005-2013 -13
2012 Pete Hoekstra MI R 1953 2 1993-2011 -20.8
2012 Todd Akin MO R 1947 2 2001-2013 -15.8
2012 Denny Rehberg MT R 1955 0 2001-2013 -3.7
2012 Shelley Berkley NV D 1951 1 1999-2013 -1.2
2012 Heather Wilson NM R 1960 1 1998-2009 -5.7
2012 Rick Berg ND R 1959 0 2011-2013 -0.9
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Chapter 5
Thesis Conclusions
The four chapters that comprise this thesis are linked in that they aim to shed light on
the incentives and eﬀects of political legislators.
There is a growing literature on ‘Deliberative Democracy’, whereby the process of
discussion and deliberation is central to the democratic process. One might argue that
legislators will only have an incentive to participate eﬀectively in such systems if they can
achieve personal payoﬀs by doing so. These chapters therefore supplement this literature
by measuring whether legislators can expect to achieve payoﬀs by participating in the
political process, either by achieving their preferred political outcomes, or by being more
likely to be reelected to their constituency seat.
The first two chapters consider the incentives that political legislators face to be active
participants in the democratic process. In particular, the first considers the incentives in
terms of the political payoﬀs that legislators might hope to achieve by winning support
from others for their preferred political outcomes. The second considers the payoﬀs that
can be achieved by being reelected to oﬃce.
Taking each of these in turn, the first chapter looks in particular at the eﬀects that
legislators can have on one-another. Such a path of influence is key if legislators are to feel
that there is a possibility of gaining the support of others for political outcomes that they
consider to be desirable. This chapter builds on the extensive literature on ‘Deliberative
Democracy’, using techniques formulated to investigate the presence of peer eﬀects in
social networks. The economics of such social networks is another area of the literature
which has attracted huge interest in recent years and this chapter builds on this literature
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in a similar way.
The second chapter considers the eﬀect that legislators can have on the probability that
they are reelected to oﬃce by being active in parliament, in particular by asking questions
in debates. This can be observed by constituents who might in turn reward legislators
because they see them as more visible, or because they are seen to be promoting causes that
are particularly significant for those constituents. A vast literature in the area of political
science considers how voters respond to various political characteristics and behaviors.
Much of this literature, however, is hampered by its inability to distinguish between the
eﬀects of the innate characteristics of the legislators being studied and the eﬀects of the
specific actions they take, such as asking parliamentary questions. The inclusion of control
variables in model specifications can only ever control for those characteristics that can be
observed and as such these studies will always be subject to criticism on the grounds of
omitted variable bias. The second chapter presented in this thesis uses the randomization
associated with a ballot system used in parliament to address these problems in an original
way.
Once it has been established that participants in the democratic system can influence
their outcomes both by gaining the support of others for their own preferred political
outcomes and by improving their own reelection probability, it is important to consider
whether the democratic system itself is conducive to promoting such desirable behaviour.
There is a large literature which considers whether impartial participants can be ex-
pected to act without bias when balancing the opposing interests of other players in the
game. This literature includes extensive analysis of referees in sports environments. The
third chapter of this thesis is the first to apply this type of analysis to a political setting
and does so to shed light on a question which has attracted much media attention in
recent years; namely whether the Speaker in the House of Commons, who is mandated
to be politically unbiased, can be relied upon to give all Members of Parliament an equal
opportunity to ask questions in debates conducted in the House of Commons.
The final part of this thesis builds on the previous chapters, by considering the rela-
tionship between legislators’ actions and the outcomes of the constituents they represent.
While this chapter is not able to identify a causal relationship, due to the possibility of
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reverse causality, it asks the question of whether certain types of legislator can be expected
to deliver particular outcomes for the constituents they represent.
The ‘bigger picture’ around all four of these chapters is that it is important to under-
stand the motivations of legislators to have any chance of designing these incentives to
ensure that they will eﬀectively carry out their duties as elected representatives. These
incentives may be purely centred around achieving re-election, or by achieving their wider
political objectives through eﬀective lobbying in Parliament.
These questions are of huge importance in the eﬀective functioning of democracy and
there is a vast literature, a small proportion of which has been cited in this thesis, which
aims to provide answers to these questions. Beyond this literature, there is a media
operation which interprets political data to hold legislators to account for their actions,
particularly when their incentives appear to diverge from those that are expected of them.
The multitude of political scandals exposed by the media are testament to that fact.
Much of this media commentary, however, and even a large part of the academic liter-
ature, draws conclusions from simply observing anomalies in the data either over time or
across legislators, thus implicitly making assumptions about constant behaviour or politi-
cal backgrounds over time and across geographical areas. In essence, many of these studies
fail to eﬀectively control for the individual characteristics of MPs. An example of such
inference would be cases where politicians and commentators infer that the Speaker of the
House of Commons is biased, based on the fact that he or she intervenes in debates more
often against one particular party. Such an inference ignores the fact that members of
that party may have certain characteristics that diﬀer from the members of other parties
and lead them to act in a way which merits greater intervention by the Speaker, even if
that Speaker was completely unbiased. These studies can draw attention to a correlation
between political outcomes, but it would be dangerous to infer causality under such strong
assumptions.
All of the chapters in this thesis address these concerns by exploiting some form of
randomization, or in the case of the final chapter, by looking at how coeﬃcients evolve
over short time-windows either side of a change in the political environment.
So to summarize, this thesis considers whether political legislators have an incentive
to participate eﬀectively in the political systems in which they operate and whether they
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can hope to influence outcomes, including legislators who are mandated to be politically
unbiased. On finding that they can do so, the thesis goes on to consider whether these ac-
tions are correlated with the outcomes of the constituents they represent, finding tentative
evidence that this is indeed the case. Looking forward, the preparation of this thesis has
involved the collection and compilation of new datasets which could be extremely informa-
tive on further aspects of the incentives faced by legislators. Further work is planned using
these datasets, for example in posing the question of whether legislators who ask parlia-
mentary questions are more likely to be elected to senior positions within their political
parties.
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